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Abstract 
This study compares and contrasts regulatory and related practices—in particular, regulatory 
decisionmaking, risk assessment and planning processes, inspection and compliance, and organization 
structure, budgets, and training—of the Minerals Management Service (MMS, now the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, or BOEMRE) with those of the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Comparing MMS practices with 
those of other federal agencies that also manage low-probability but high-consequence environmental 
risks provides a basis for identifying opportunities for enhancing regulatory capacity and safety 
performance in managing deepwater energy exploration and production. Our research finds important 
differences in processes for setting standards; peer review contribution to the rulemaking process; 
establishment of tolerable risk thresholds; and training of key staff. The paper concludes with several 
recommendations for how various EPA and FAA practices might be modified and used at BOEMRE to 
strengthen its regulatory and risk management processes. 
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Managing Environmental, Health, and Safety Risks: A Comparative 
Assessment of the Minerals Management Service and Other 
Agencies 
 Lynn Scarlett, Arthur Fraas, Richard Morgenstern, and Timothy Murphy 
All findings, opinions, statements, and recommendations contained in this report are solely those of its 
authors. The report has been submitted to the staff of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill and Offshore Drilling, but the report is not the work product of the Commission or its staff, and should not be 
construed in any respect as the official or unofficial findings, opinions, statements, or recommendations of the 
Commission or its staff. 
Executive Summary 
The ability of the federal government to manage current and future environmental, health, 
and safety (EHS) risks associated with offshore energy exploration and production depends in 
large part on the technical practices, procedures, accountability, and effectiveness of the 
responsible regulatory agency. Comparing these practices with those of other federal agencies 
that also manage low-probability but high-consequence EHS risks provides a basis for 
identifying opportunities for enhancing regulatory capacity and safety performance in managing 
deepwater energy exploration and production. In this study, we compare and contrast regulatory 
and related practices of the Minerals Management Service (MMS, now the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, or BOEMRE) with those of two other 
agencies: the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which regulates aviation safety, and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which administers all or part of 32 statutes, including 
10 major ones covering air, water, and land pollution, and pesticide and chemical regulation. 
                                                 
 Scarlett, Visiting Scholar; Fraas, Visiting Scholar; Morgenstern, Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future. Murphy, 
Presidential Management Fellow, Department of Energy. 
DISCLAIMER: This project was funded by the Department of Energy, National Energy Technology Laboratory an 
agency of the United States Government, through a support contract with Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. Neither the 
United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., nor 
any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for 
the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents 
that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, 
or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its 
endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and 
opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any 
agency thereof. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
2 
Historically, offshore oil spills have resulted from three types of incidents: platform 
events, pipeline events, and tanker spills. Before the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Outer 
Continental Shelf (OCS) area regulated by MMS had not suffered a platform or pipeline spill 
larger than 1 million gallons since 1970, according to records maintained by MMS (BOEMRE). 
In the past, tankers accounted for most spill volume, but since 1990 that distribution has shifted 
toward nontanker sources.  
MMS handled planning, leasing, technical and other safety regulations, and compliance 
inspections and enforcement. Planning, regulatory, and permitting processes include four 
elements relevant to understanding how safety and environmental management might be 
improved: regulatory decisionmaking, risk assessment and planning processes, inspection and 
compliance processes, and organization structure, budgets, and training. We examine these 
structures and processes and compare them with related processes of FAA and EPA. 
Regulatory Decisionmaking 
Processes for setting standards in the three agencies differ in several ways, including (1) 
the extent to which they draw upon industry voluntary consensus standards to develop agency 
regulations; (2) their use of performance-based versus prescriptive regulations; and (3) their use 
of independent analyses, including peer review, to identify, recommend, and assess regulations 
and safety.  
Voluntary Consensus Standards 
Through voluntary consensus standard-setting processes, companies, equipment 
manufacturers, regulators, and others establish best practices and standards for technology and 
operational procedures. These voluntary standard-setting processes, encouraged under federal 
law, must conform to various practices concerning transparency, governance, and open 
participation.  
MMS (BOEMRE) participates in consensus-based standard-setting processes for offshore 
energy production and incorporates some of the resulting standards, in whole or in part, into 
agency safety and other regulations. The agency periodically has contracted with outside 
engineering and other experts to review emergent technologies and undertake comparative risk 
assessments. In some instances, as a result of these analyses, MMS opted for different standards 
in its regulations or made modifications to voluntary consensus standards.  
FAA also uses voluntary consensus standards to establish minimum operational 
performance standards for equipment or specifications for procurement. However, FAA does not 
use voluntary consensus standards for its aviation safety standards. EPA seldom uses voluntary 
consensus standards. EPA believes that voluntary consensus standards are “too broad to be 
useful in a regulatory sense,” “lack quality control and quality assurance requirements,” or are Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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“too general, too broad, or not sufficiently detailed to assure compliance with EPA regulatory 
requirements.” Instead, in almost all cases, EPA uses its expertise and the authority granted to it 
by Congress to establish its own standards. 
The different uses of voluntary consensus standards result, in part, from different 
regulatory purposes and focuses of the three agencies. A review of agency records and industry 
performance indicates that use of such standards does not, per se, appear to compromise safety or 
result in “lowest common denominator” standards. Considerations include extent of participation 
in the standard-setting process by diverse stakeholders with relevant expertise, agency use of 
independent reviews when evaluating whether to incorporate such standards in its regulations, 
and transparency of safety and environmental performance goals. 
Performance-Based versus Prescriptive Standards  
MMS and its successor agency BOEMRE have relied on a combination of performance-
based and prescriptive standards. Though offshore performance for four decades was relatively 
good in terms of environmental releases, discussion around two issues has persisted over more 
than a decade. First is whether and how to use a performance-based approach to safety 
regulations. Second is how to shift more responsibility and accountability to companies for their 
overall safety and environmental performance. 
A performance approach emphasizes clear safety standards, audits, verification, 
investigations, and significant interaction between industry and the regulator to undertake joint 
safety studies and develop regulations. In a prescriptive system, laws and regulations set specific 
structural, technical (engineering and equipment), and procedural requirements as the basis for 
minimizing environmental, health, and safety hazards. Under the prescriptive system, 
compliance is achieved by using specified structures and equipment, adhering to specified types 
of training, and following specified procedures.  
Increasingly, across many industry sectors, regulatory frameworks are moving toward 
performance standards. This trend is evident in the offshore oil and gas realm. Norway, for 
example, now uses primarily performance-based standards, with some supplemental prescriptive 
requirements. As described in a 2010 Norwegian report delineating differences between U.S. and 
Norwegian approaches to offshore regulation, performance-based regulations involve specifying 
“the performance or function which is to be attained or maintained by the industry. The 
regulatory role here involves defining the safety standards which companies must meet and 
checking that they have the management systems which permit such compliance.” 
Although MMS (BOEMRE) uses some performance-based regulations, it has not 
emulated Norway or the United Kingdom, which require companies to identify risks at specific 
offshore sites and show how their technologies and practices would mitigate those risks to 
specific safety performance levels. However, MMS has sought other ways to enhance safety Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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practices and encourage development of “safety cultures” within firms, including issuance of a 
new environmental and safety management rule. 
On October 15, 2010, MMS issued a final rule requiring all firms to have a safety and 
environmental management system (SEMS). A quality management approach to controlling risk, 
SEMS provides managers with a detailed roadmap for monitoring safety-related processes. It 
emphasizes safety and environmental management as a fundamental business process to be 
incorporated within the organization and provides a framework to support a sound safety culture. 
SEMS applies to overall company practices rather than to site-specific performance assessment, 
mitigation measures, and operational procedures, as required in the Norwegian and U.K. 
regulations. 
The SEMS approach parallels a similar trend within FAA. In 2004, FAA established 
guidelines for the adoption of “safety management systems” by air carriers and others activities 
in the aviation sector. With recent adoption of the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation 
Administration Extension Act, FAA must establish requirements for safety management systems 
within aviation’s organizational structures (e.g., air service providers and government air traffic 
controllers). Similarly, many firms regulated by EPA use these systems approaches to 
environmental and safety management, though such approaches are not generally mandated by 
EPA. 
Site-specific and general environmental and safety management systems aim to 
strengthen safety cultures and accountability within firms. Challenges to their effective 
implementation include ensuring that they (1) are comprehensive in their identification and 
mitigation of significant hazards, including human behavior considerations; (2) provide clear 
documentation; and (3) include means of effectively addressing changing or unexpected 
circumstances. Consequently, such systems, though potentially helpful in enhancing a focus on 
safety, require periodic independent audits of their substance, implementation, and effectiveness 
in improving safety results. 
Independent Analyses and Peer Review 
MMS has used various organizations and processes to provide some outside advice, peer 
review, and assessment of its regulatory and related activities. However, the agency does not 
have regular procedures for conducting peer review of its risk models, safety standards, and 
regulations. A review shows that the agency contracted on numerous occasions with various 
academic experts and other consultants to undertake quantitative risk assessments of different 
technologies, review its regulations for adequacy, and complete other tasks.  
MMS has also used incident panels to review accidents, spills, and other compliance 
issues, but it manages these panels internally, unlike the air transportation industry, in which an 
independent board, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), undertakes all evaluations Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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of airplane crashes and related safety incidents. Based on these evaluations, NTSB makes 
recommendations to FAA for regulatory action and evaluates the FAA response. NTSB also 
conducts safety studies and evaluates the effectiveness of regulatory programs for the 
transportation agencies. Finally, it reviews the appeals of enforcement actions taken by FAA 
involving aviation certificates and appeals of FAA civil penalty actions. Although FAA typically 
does not rely on peer review of its regulations, its regulations are under the continuing scrutiny 
of NTSB. 
In addition to NTSB, FAA uses independent forums or institutions to provide peer 
review, recommendations, and other input into the regulatory process. With industry, it formed 
the Civilian Aviation Safety Team (CAST) in 1998 with the goal of reducing fatal commercial 
accidents by 80 percent by 2007. CAST has analyzed data from hundreds of fatal accidents and 
thousands of incidents to identify and recommend safety enhancements. In its second decade, 
CAST is developing a “proactive” approach to assessing emerging risks before accidents occur, a 
shift from the “reactive” approach of reviewing data from accidents and incidents.  
FAA has adopted a structural approach to ensuring safety. FAA’s System Safety 
Handbook sets out a matrix of the severity and likelihood of an incident as a basis for 
establishing priorities for agency response. Once FAA identifies an area of concern and begins 
its investigation for rulemaking, it relies on joint industry-FAA committees to develop 
recommendations on the appropriate regulatory response. These committees do not provide a 
venue for regulatory negotiation; FAA is not bound by their recommendations. FAA seeks to 
balance the likelihood and severity of the incident with the cost of implementing corrective 
action. Thus, where it can reasonably quantify the consequences of safety hazards, FAA uses 
benefit-cost and cost-effectiveness analysis in making its regulatory decisions. 
Among the three agencies, EPA has placed the greatest emphasis on peer review and 
independent analysis. EPA has established a formal policy for conducting peer review of 
scientifically and technically based outputs, including economic and social science products, that 
are intended to inform its decisions. Peer review is deemed to occur when the designated work 
products are evaluated by relevant experts who were not involved in creating the product itself. 
EPA also relies on a series of committees established under the authority of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACA) to obtain advice on a wide range of environmental issues.  
Risk Assessment and Planning Processes 
MMS risk management occurs in (1) the planning and leasing process and (2) the 
regulatory process for establishing safety and environmental regulations. MMS uses an oil spill 
risk model to evaluate the likelihood of a spill’s occurrence and, if a spill occurs, the risks of 
adverse environmental impacts. The model has three basic components: (1) estimates of the 
probability that a spill will occur; (2) simulated trajectories of spills to critical environmental Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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resources; and (3) combined results of the first two elements to estimate the risks from potential 
oil spills.  
In addition to its use in National Environmental Policy Act environmental impact 
statements, the MMS risk model is used in environmental assessments, oil spill response plans, 
environmental reports completed by companies, biological opinions for Endangered Species Act 
consultations, and other federal agency reports to satisfy various legal requirements. Any 
concerns about the model thus propagate through most oil spill analyses. 
The Oil Spill Risk Model itself has been subject to various technical and analytical 
critiques. However, for understanding risk management in the offshore oil and gas context, our 
focus is on three broader institutional and decisionmaking issues: (1) what formal, regular, and 
transparent processes exist to periodically review, validate, and improve risk models used by the 
agency and industry; (2) how information generated by models is used to inform 
decisionmaking, including decisions about risk mitigation; and (3) what standards, if any, are 
used as the benchmark or goal for managing and mitigating risk. 
How the model is used to inform decisionmaking has raised concern because any initial 
estimate of extremely low probability of a spill has cascading effects. For the Macondo well, the 
risk model generated estimates of 4,600 barrels of oil as the most likely size of a large spill and 
no more than 26,000 barrels spilled over the entire 40-year life of production activity on six 
leases, including the Macondo well site. These estimates resulted in a determination of “no 
significant impact” from the project. 
Even if the Oil Spill Risk model is useful in estimating probabilities of a spill and 
projecting likelihood that such spills will result in adverse impacts, a larger decisionmaking issue 
looms: how safe is safe enough? Risk models themselves do not establish what constitutes 
“acceptable” or “tolerable” risk. Central challenges in determining safety policy are whether to 
set a quantitative risk standard and whether and how to use quantitative risk analysis. In general, 
MMS has not set numeric standards for unacceptable, tolerable, and acceptable risk either in its 
planning process or in setting safety standards.  
Many other agencies have established numerical thresholds for unacceptable risk. 
Quantifying risks and evaluating them against a numerical threshold are not straightforward, 
involving assumptions and uncertainties. However, such calculations, in many circumstances, 
can be accomplished and provide agencies with means for determining whether additional safety 
enhancements are necessary to achieve a specified risk threshold. If data and assumptions used in 
these calculations are transparent, others can independently review and critique such analyses, 
facilitating analytic improvements and public acceptance of agency risk management choices.  
The rationale for use of qualitative rather than quantitative assessments relates, in part, to 
data quality. In one quantitative risk assessment comparing different deepwater production 
systems, two of five recommendations pertain to data. The report’s second recommendation Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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states, “[T]he quality of existing data sets for the Gulf of Mexico should be improved so that they 
are of greater value in future risk analyses.” The report’s third recommendation reads, 
“Additional information about the populations of offshore facilities and operations in the Gulf of 
Mexico should be collected on an annual basis.”  
Despite data and analytic challenges, other agencies, including EPA and FAA, use 
numerical risk thresholds or ranges of tolerable risk. For example, in support of its wide array of 
regulatory actions, EPA has issued scientific documents outlining principles and concepts that 
guide risk assessment for carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, developmental toxicity, exposure, 
chemical mixtures, and other risks. For these purposes, the agency has established a lifetime 
human health risk range of 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1,000,000 as generally acceptable for regulatory 
decisions and for site cleanup. Substantial portions of EPA’s $2.9 billion program and 
management budget are devoted to quantitative risk assessments, as well as to technology and 
economic assessments, including regulatory impact analyses. 
FAA is enhancing its risk assessments by adopting a “proactive” approach to data 
analysis to identify precursors that could result in aviation safety risks. FAA views this shift as 
necessary because, as accidents become increasingly rare, it is harder to identify the safety issues 
through traditional reactive analyses. Thus, an important element to this new approach is the 
development of a much broader database of events through voluntary self-reporting to identify 
possible aviation safety risks. Because these reports can involve possible noncompliance with 
FAA regulations, these programs provide incentives to encourage voluntary reports by resolving 
noncompliance through corrective action rather than through punishment or discipline. If the 
conditions set out in these programs are met, the enforcement action for individuals reporting the 
safety issue will be closed with no more than an administrative action. Several FAA programs 
encourage air carrier and repair station employees to make voluntary reports of safety 
information and provide data that will help identify precursors to accidents.  
Organization Structure and Training 
Structure 
MMS was designed primarily along regional geographic lines, with vertical oversight 
provided between headquarters, regions, and districts. The structure had two effects: safety and 
leasing functions were combined under single supervisory authority, and safety and 
environmental personnel were pulled from district offices that handled day-to-day offshore 
permitting and review functions and placed, instead, at the regional level.  
Throughout its existence, MMS faced some criticism that a functional organization 
structure would better ensure equal (and independent) focus on the three main functional areas. 
Notably, one major difference between U.S. and Norwegian management of offshore activities 
was in organization structures. In Norway, authorities for leasing or resource management and Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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for health, safety, and environmental regulation reside in two separate organizations. With 
Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar’s May 2010 secretarial order, U.S. offshore operations will 
resemble the Norwegian structure, in which safety and leasing operations are segregated into 
different organizations.  
Training 
Of seven elements identified as contributing to the Macondo well disaster by the 
Deepwater Horizon Study Group at the Center for Catastrophic Risk Management, five can be 
considered “failures in administrative controls—Human and Organization Factor (HOF) 
malfunctions.” Administrative control failures include “deviation from standard operating 
procedures …, failure to follow accepted well completion procedures, failure to respond to 
trouble indicators, failure to maintain [emergency shutdown and disconnect] systems, and failure 
to fully test and activate the [blowout preventers].” MMS recently reviewed 310 OCS incidents 
(including fatalities, injuries, loss of well control, collisions, fires, pollution, and crane events) 
from 2003 and 2004 and found that 159, or more than half, involved failures to follow proper 
operating procedures; another 13 involved poor management of change. Together, these failures 
accounted for 51 percent of the incidents reviewed.  
Despite improved results upon introduction of its performance-based training 
requirements, inadequacies in current training practices persist. Among the issues raised were: 
  Lack of cross-training. One study in Australia showed that most oil rig workers who 
performed cementing tasks did not know that one-third of blowouts were due to 
cementing problems. Similar deficiencies in cross-training, according to former MMS 
officials, also exist in U.S. offshore oil and gas operations. 
  Inadequate reinforcement of safety behavioral incentives. 
EPA has developed training programs throughout the agency to maintain and upgrade the 
skills and knowledge of its staff. For example, the agency’s in-house National Enforcement 
Training Institute serves as a clearinghouse for training information within the enforcement and 
compliance assurance program, exploring cost-effective means of delivering both classroom and 
distance training. It supports training of federal, state, local, and tribal attorneys, inspectors, civil 
and criminal investigators, and technical experts in all the various tools for environmental 
compliance and enforcement. It also conducts a range of activities, including (1) identification of 
strategic education and training needs that reflect priorities and important gaps in knowledge; (2) 
ensuring that needed education and training are identified and available; and 3) covering the full 
spectrum of the primary tools to promote compliance. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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FAA has significant technical capacity, including use of certified engineers and others 
with special training and experience, to perform its regulatory oversight functions and airline 
certification program. 
Inspections, Compliance, and Enforcement 
In 2000—a decade before the Macondo well blowout—WEST Engineering Services 
surveyed 20 Gulf of Mexico rigs to determine compliance with recommended items or standards. 
They concluded that “in general, the rigs surveyed had a very high level of compliance with 
MMS and industry standards. Rigs surveyed had a total of 934 compliances with assessment 
points and 55 that were not in compliance.” The WEST survey of MMS regulations, notices to 
lessees, and safety alerts noted that compliance of surveyed items was observed 84.8 percent of 
the time, and in some cases, practices recommended by the American Petroleum Institute (API) 
and developed through the voluntary consensus standards process were more stringent than 
MMS OCS regulations. 
The purpose of MMS inspections is to ensure compliance with federal law, federal 
regulations, lease and right-of-way agreements, and approved exploration, development, and 
production plans. According to MMS regulations, these inspections are particularly concerned 
with verifying that equipment designed to prevent blowouts, spills, fires, and other accidents has 
been installed and is operating properly. Regulations specify that MMS conduct a scheduled 
inspection of each facility at least once a year and conduct unscheduled inspections 
“periodically.”  
Of the 49,903 noncompliance notices issued between 1998 and 2010, less than 1 percent 
resulted in civil penalties, for an average of 34 per year. Despite relatively high levels of 
compliance, several safety and small spill incidents prompted MMS several years ago to begin 
testing risk-based approaches to inspections. Under this approach, the agency developed criteria 
associated with higher risks—that is, noncompliance issues that were considered to hold the 
greatest potential to result in major accidents or environmental harm. 
Both FAA and EPA include inspections and compliance as critical activities. FAA has 
established a formal enforcement decision tool for determining the appropriate responses to 
violations. The inspector identifying the violation makes the first judgment as to the appropriate 
response, and that judgment is reviewed by supervisors in the local FAA office. A decision to 
take “no action” or an administrative action (such as a warning notice) is not reviewed further 
within FAA. A recommendation for legal sanction by the local office is reviewed by the regional 
enforcement office and the Office of the General Council.  
Enforcement of the environmental statutes it administers is a high priority for EPA. 
Roughly 20 percent of its workforce is engaged in enforcement activities. EPA sets national 
enforcement initiatives every three years to focus resources on the most significant Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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environmental problems and human health challenges identified by EPA staff, states, tribes, and 
the public.  
Enforcement challenges for all three agencies include (1) how to best target inspection 
and enforcement resources, including use of tools to identify highest-risk activities and poor 
performers; (2) how to generate full reporting of compliance and safety incidents and issues, 
since agency inspectors cannot review all sites and equipment at all times; (3) how to foster 
corrective actions by the regulated entity; and (4) how to enhance overall accountability by 
regulated entities for their safety and environmental performance. 
Recommendations 
A comparative evaluation of regulatory structures and management practices can help 
illuminate effective practices and opportunities for improvement. We offer recommendations 
that result from this comparative evaluation. We underscore, however, that these 
recommendations must be accompanied by other changes pertaining to corporate culture, 
techniques, and operational incentives; emergency preparedness and response; and risk 
assessment and management to produce a composite set of improvements aimed at enhancing 
safety. 
The Department of the Interior and BOEMRE have taken several actions to improve 
safety and reduce risks associated with offshore oil and gas activities. We consider two 
particularly important. The first is a reorganization that, when fully implemented, will segregate 
safety and leasing functions into two separate bureaus. The second is the October 15, 2010, 
release of the Final Rule on Safety and Environmental Management Systems, which incorporates 
by reference the entire API Recommended Practice 75, with its general procedures and all 12 
specific elements. An important feature is the emphasis on the external auditing role of the 
federal agency. The new rule is an important step forward. Below, we offer some additional 
recommendations. 
Agency Structure and Organization Oversight 
On May 19, 2010, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar issued an executive order 
announcing a reorganization of the Minerals Management Service. The reorganization will place 
the leasing and safety functions of the agency in two separate organizations, with separate 
supervisors, to bring independent attention to safety considerations in budgeting and 
decisionmaking. The department has not yet completed the reorganization, pending an outside 
management review. We endorse the general outlines of the reorganization and offer two 
considerations as the Department considers how to fully implement the secretarial order. In 
designing the new bureaus consideration should be given to: Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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  Maintaining interbureau coordination on matters such as planning and leasing, expected 
levels of leasing and platform activity, and scientific research. 
  Providing safety capacity down to the field level rather than providing that capacity only 
at the regional level and in headquarters. 
Risk Assessment and Risk Management 
The safety agency should develop specific guidance on risk assessment and risk 
management methods and practices. We suggest two methodologies: 
  Setting quantitative thresholds or standards for acceptable, tolerable, and unacceptable 
risk. In reviews of particular rules, techniques, and practices, deviations from these 
standards should be based on rigorous analysis. Actual decisions about any deviations 
from the standards should be made at the highest levels of the agency. The practices of 
FAA, the United Kingdom’s Health and Safety Executive, and other agencies that use 
quantitative thresholds should be evaluated as possible models.  
  Using accident precursor analysis, if feasible, instead of historical spill data to develop 
risk assessments of low-probability major oil spills by identifying the failure probabilities 
of accident components.  
Regulatory Processes and Best Practices 
The agency should further emphasize safety and environmental performance-based 
approaches to risk management such as those used in Norway and the United Kingdom for 
offshore oil and gas development. We suggest four specifics: 
  Ensuring that operator self-analysis and risk-based performance assessments include 
verifiable information and are subject to independent, third-party audits. In addition, the 
agency should periodically audit operators’ self-assessments and performance at each 
site. 
  Establishing clear risk thresholds. These should be used to evaluate alternative 
compliance options and develop specific guidance on implementation by regions and 
field offices. The agency can also apply these thresholds to determine whether 
compliance alternatives meet established performance goals. 
  Establishing independent peer review to determine whether the regulations are adequate 
for achieving the standards. The peer review groups should include strong representation 
from outside the regulated community. Independent reviews and risk thresholds should 
become formal, regular requirements of the agency’s oversight. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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  Exploring the creation of a permanent, independent entity to investigate offshore oil spills 
that are greater than a specified magnitude. This independent body would identify 
probable causes and make recommendations on ways to prevent recurrences. 
The People Factor 
The agency’s move toward performance-based training requirements would benefit from 
two actions: 
  Requiring a higher degree of cross-training among skill sets, to ensure the safe operations 
of a platform and associated exploration and production equipment and processes. 
  Using data concerning incidents of noncompliance to identify areas in which inspectors 
need additional or different training. Here, the agency could draw from the experience of 
EPA’s compliance training program.  
 
Enforcement and Compliance 
We suggest two approaches: 
  Creating a stronger incentive system for operators and contractors to report risks and 
problems without penalty (similar to programs developed by both FAA and EPA). The 
program would not apply to actions associated with criminal violations, fatal accidents, 
and major injuries.  
  Continuing and strengthening the annual operator reviews, in which corrective actions are 
discussed. This process reinforces a focus on improvement, targeting poor performers 
and repeated incidents of noncompliance. The discussions do not replace continued use 
of penalties and legal sanctions, where warranted under regulations and based on the type 
of noncompliance. However, they enhance those traditional compliance tools by directing 
attention to corrective action, particularly for repeat instances of noncompliance. 
1. Introduction 
The ability of the federal government to manage current and future environmental, health 
and safety (EHS) risks associated with offshore energy exploration and production depends in 
part on the technical and procedural practices, accountability, and effectiveness of the 
responsible regulatory agency. These regulatory and management responsibilities have become 
increasingly challenging in a context of rapidly evolving technologies and new frontiers of 
energy production. A series of events over the past several years put the Minerals Management 
Service (MMS) under intense scrutiny. But it was the explosion on April 20, 2010, of the Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
13 
deepwater Macondo oil well in the Gulf of Mexico that triggered a reconstituting of the agency 
as the new Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE). 
This reorganization, however, is the beginning rather than the end of a thorough reexamination 
of how the nation can reduce risks and enhance safety associated with offshore energy 
exploration and production.  
That inquiry requires evaluating the capacity of MMS (now BOEMRE) to carry out its 
planning, regulatory and enforcement responsibilities. Comparing these practices and associated 
data with similar data, practices, and information from other federal agencies also managing low-
probability but high-consequence EHS risks provides a basis for identifying opportunities for 
enhancing regulatory capacity and safety performance in the management of deepwater energy 
exploration and production activities. Though all aspects of EHS are relevant to improving the 
regulatory capacity of the newly formulated BOEMRE, we focus on the issues most relevant to 
human safety and environmental releases: 
  the scope and depth of the analyses produced by the agency, including the breadth of the 
technical and regulatory options considered; 
  the techniques and processes used to evaluate and manage risk; 
  the processes for identifying best practices, including the role of voluntary consensus 
standards; 
  the resources available to conduct EHS analyses; 
  the types of peer review processes employed; 
  the training and experience of the technical staff; 
  the training and experience of consultants regularly used by the agency; and 
  the character, frequency and extent of enforcement activities. 
 
In this study, we compare and contrast the identified issues as performed by MMS and 
two other agencies—the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). All three agencies have responsibilities for oversight and regulation of 
some activities that involve potentially low-probability but high-consequence environmental, 
health, and safety risks. In addition to these interagency comparisons, we also describe some 
relevant practices of other nations that oversee and regulate offshore, deepwater oil and gas 
production activities.  Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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2. Minerals Management Service 
Background 
Agency History  
The mission of the former Minerals Management Service, established in 1982 by 
administrative action of the Secretary of the Interior, was “to manage the mineral resources on 
the outer continental shelf in an environmentally sound and safe manner and to timely collect, 
verify, and distribute mineral revenues from federal and Indian lands.”1 The new agency 
combined several functions that had been dispersed among several agencies and offices within 
the Department of the Interior. These functions included operation of offshore minerals leasing, 
minerals revenue collections and disbursements, and regulation of offshore energy exploration 
and production.  
Before MMS was created, revenue collections, safety oversight and regulations, and 
offshore resource assessments had been undertaken by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 
within the Department of the Interior. Offshore leasing was conducted by the Bureau of Land 
Management, which also conducted onshore oil and gas leasing on federal public lands.  
Substantial problems in the management of minerals royalty collections and 
disbursements led to creation of the Commission on the Fiscal Accountability of the Nation’s 
Energy Resources (Linowes Commission), which issued its report in January 1982. Among the 
commission’s findings was a conclusion that “the scientifically oriented Geological Survey, 
which now manages royalties, has never been able to supply the active, sophisticated 
management that is needed. It is largely for this reason that the Commission recommends 
removing the royalty management function from the Geological Survey …”2 
In part as a response to this recommendation and to other problems of coordinating 
royalty collections, safety oversight, and leasing activities associated with offshore energy 
production, the Secretary of the Interior established the Minerals Management Service, which 
took on responsibility for these functions. Initially, MMS used a regional structure, with each 
regional director having responsibility for all functions and reporting to an associate director at 
the Washington headquarters also responsible for all functions at the national level of program 
administration. Environmental safety functions were combined with leasing activities at the 
regional level. Environmental specialists at the field level under the earlier USGS structure were 
                                                 
1 Minerals Management Service, Mission Statement, Strategic Plan, June 2, 1997. 
2 Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation’s Energy Resources (Linowes Commission), U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, DC, January 1982, p. xvi. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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moved into regional offices and combined with leasing operations. At the Washington 
headquarters level, a separate environmental office within MMS was established, and all 
offshore regulations were prepared and processed in the headquarters operations office.  
Just over a decade later, in 1994, MMS was restructured “to meet the objectives of the 
Clinton Administration’s Reinventing Government effort and the National Performance Review 
(NPR) in its commitment to invent a leaner government …”3 As part of that reorganization, 
several functions were consolidated at the headquarters level. However, these consolidations did 
not fundamentally restructure how MMS functioned. Throughout its existence, MMS generally 
did not use a function-based management structure, though several management reviews 
proposed such a structure.4 Instead, the organization operated using a regional geographic 
structure, with most functions combined within the regions and falling under headquarters 
supervision. 
On May 19, 2010, a month after the Macondo blowout, the secretary of the Interior 
reorganized offshore activities, shifting MMS functions into three organizations (see Figure 1). 
These include a new Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulations, and Enforcement 
(BOEMRE) and, when the reorganization is complete, a Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement, both reporting to the assistant secretary for Land and Minerals Management, plus 
an Office of Natural Resources Revenue (located under the assistant secretary for Policy, 
Management, and Budget). In the reorganization, safety functions will be segregated from 
offshore leasing functions and will no longer be managed under a single director within a single 
bureau.  
   
                                                 
3 MMS Press Release, July 7, 1994. 
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around 3,500 platforms, of which 978 are manned.7 Approximately 90 rigs, including 68 mobile 
offshore drilling units and 22 platform rigs, are active in the Gulf. In 2008, the last year for 
which complete data are available, federal offshore tracts generated some 1.7 million barrels of 
oil daily and 6.6 million cubic feet of natural gas, or about 446 million barrels of oil and 2.4 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas annually.8 Federal revenues collected annually come from bonus 
bids in the leasing process and from royalty revenues, which vary depending on resource prices 
and volumes produced. Total federal offshore royalty revenues have fluctuated throughout the 
last decade, from as low as $4.1 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2002 to as high as $18 billion in FY 
2008.9 Additional revenues from bonus bids from lease auctions have ranged from $85 million 
(nominal dollars) to $9.5 billion in 2008.10 
Safety and Environmental Record 
Environmental and safety performance offshore comprises two categories: (1) accidents 
and fatalities in the workforce; and (2) incidents resulting in oil spills and other pollutant releases 
into the environment.  
Workplace safety. MMS tracks workplace safety in OCS oil and gas operations by 
recording the number of injuries and fatalities suffered by OCS workers annually, as well as two 
composite indices, the Operator Safety Index and the Annual Composite Accident Severity 
Ratio. MMS sets goals for each of these indicators each year. No clear trend in workplace safety 
performance is apparent in recent years. For example, in 2008 MMS recorded both an unusually 
low number of fatalities and an unusually high accident severity ratio.11  
Oil spill record. Historically, oil spills have resulted from three types of incidents: 
platform events, pipeline events, and tanker spills. Overall, both the frequency of oil spill 
incidents and the volume of releases have declined over the past 20 years, excluding spills 
associated with the dramatic 2005 hurricanes, Katrina and Rita.12 
                                                 
7 American Petroleum Institute, Joint Industry Task Force, July 6, 2010. 
8 Energy Information Agency (see http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_CRD_CRPDN_ADC_MBBL_A.htm and 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dcu_rusf_a.htm).  
9 Office of Natural Resources Revenue, http://www.mrm.boemre.gov/MRMWebStats/. 
10 Department of the Interior, Office of Policy Analysis, “Economic Background on Interior’s Oil and Gas Policy,” 
February 17, 2010, 8. 
11 Program Assessment Rating Tool report, Outer Continental Shelf Minerals Regulation and Compliance, 2005, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003715.2005.html. 
12 J.L. Ramseur, CRS Report for Congress, “Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background, Governance, and Issues 
for Congress,” Updated September 2008; U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Investigations and Compliance Analysis, 
“Polluting Incidents In and Around U.S. Waters: A Spill/Release Compendium: 1969–2008,” August 2010, 3–8. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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In its August 2010 report, “Polluting Incidents in and around U.S. Waters,” the U.S. 
Coast Guard reviewed 36 years and more than 354,000 investigation reports. The report found 
that “the majority of spills …involved discharges of between one and one hundred gallons,” but 
that most spill volumes “can be attributed to a small number of incidents each year.”13 Nearly 70 
percent of the volume of spills from 1973 to 2008 resulted from spills greater than 100,000 
gallons.14 Prior to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Outer Continental Shelf area regulated by 
MMS had not suffered a platform or pipeline spill larger than 1 million gallons since 1970, 
according to records maintained by MMS/BOEMRE.  
Historically, tankers have accounted for most spill volume, but since 1990 that 
distribution “has shifted toward non-tank vessel sources.” Since the Exxon Valdez tanker spill in 
1989, the frequency and volume of tanker spills have declined dramatically as stricter 
international regulations, threats of significant liability, and improved technologies and training 
have shaped the operating environment. Before the Macondo well blowout, offshore platforms 
were associated with no large spills over a 40-year period and, overall, had a good performance 
record. 
Figures 2 through 5 include data from all U.S. waters regulated by the Coast Guard and 
are not limited to the OCS area regulated by BOEMRE. However, this information is included to 
illustrate general trends in the nature of oil spill incidents. 
   
                                                 
13 U.S. Coast Guard, “Polluting Incidents In and Around U.S. Waters,” August 2010, 3. 
14 Ibid., 8. Resource
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One analysis of spills from platforms over a 15-year period (1985–1999) showed 0.13 
spills greater than 1,000 barrels per billion barrels of oil and 0.05 spills greater than 10,000 
barrels per billion barrels of oil (Table 1).15  
Table 1. Oil Spill Rates Based on 1985–1999 Data 
Spill Source  Spills ≥ 1,000 bbl  Spills ≥ 10,000 
OCS Platform  0.13 per Bbbl  0.05 per Bbbl 
OCS Pipelines  1.38 per Bbbl  0.34 per Bbbl 
OCS Tankers  0.72 per Bbbl  0.25 per Bbbl 
Sources: C.M. Anderson and R.P. LaBelle, 1990, Estimated Occurrence Rates for Accidental Oil Spills on the U.S. 
Outer Continental Shelf, Oil and Chemical Pollution 6:21-35 (cited in Zhen-Gang Ji, et al., “Oil-Spill Risk Analysis: 
Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lease Sales, Central Planning Area and Western Planning Area, 
2003-2007, and Gulfwide OCS Program, 2003-2042,” DOI, MMS, June 2002. 
Reflecting this record, over the past two decades offshore oil and gas safety was not the 
focus of any reviews or reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the 
Congressional Research Service, the National Research Council, or the National Academy of 
Public Administration. Nor was offshore oil and gas safety the primary focus of congressional 
oversight proceedings during this time. Rather, the focus has been largely on matters of royalties 
and revenue collections. 
Offshore Planning and Regulatory Processes 
Under MMS, planning, leasing, technical and other safety regulations, and compliance 
inspections and enforcement were all handled by the agency. By law, the planning process 
includes development of a five-year plan, which includes an oil spill risk analysis for the areas 
eligible for leasing under the plan. Subsequent to the five-year planning process, the agency 
develops plans for selling and issuing individual leases.  
Once leases are issued, MMS (BOEMRE) reviews and, if satisfactory, approves 
exploration plans pursuant to issuing exploration drilling permits. In the final permitting step, the 
agency reviews production plans and, if approved, issues production drilling permits. For the 
exploration and production phases, MMS typically used either environmental assessments (EAs) 
or categorical exclusions (CXs), if no additional impacts beyond those identified in the five-year 
and one-year planning documents were identified. Under MMS, the decision to prepare an EA at 
the permitting phase (rather than a CX) was made by the regional supervisor for Leasing and 
Environment or by the chief of the Environment Division. Typically, outside the Gulf of Mexico, 
                                                 
15 Z.-G. Ji et al., “Oil-Spill Risk Analysis: Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lease Sales, Central 
Planning Area and Western Planning Area, 2003–2007, and Gulfwide OCS Program, 2003–2042,” U.S. Department 
of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, June 2002. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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EAs were generally used in the exploration and development phases; in the Gulf, MMS often 
used categorical exclusions, with impact assessment essentially tiered back to the broader leasing 
and five-year planning environmental impact statement (EIS) documents. 
Both the five-year planning and lease planning processes include oil spill risk assessment 
in the EIS analyses. As part of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, MMS 
(BOEMRE) also provides the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and/or the Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) with details on the proposed oil and gas activity, species listed under the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) and designated critical habitat in the area, and related 
information on the proposed action’s effects on these species. Also included are measures to 
reduce or eliminate effects on listed species. If MMS, NMFS, or FWS determined that an action 
might adversely affect listed species or designated critical habitat, MMS would undertake a 
formal consultation process and obtain a biological opinion on whether the action was likely to 
jeopardize a listed species or habitat. Other regulatory requirements under the Coastal Zone 
Management Act, Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Oil Pollution Act, and National Historic 
Preservation Act are also covered through the exploration and development permitting processes. 
Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9 summarize the regulatory process under MMS. 
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Regulatory Development: Decisionmaking Criteria and Analysis 
MMS (now BOEMRE) planning, regulatory, and permitting processes constitute the 
framework within which companies and the agencies address environmental and safety issues. 
That framework includes four elements relevant to understanding how safety and environmental 
management might be improved: regulatory decisionmaking, risk assessment and planning 
processes; organization structure and capacity; and inspection and compliance processes. 
Regulatory Decisionmaking, Risk Assessment, and Planning  
Metrics and measurements of performance. MMS uses a variety of measures and metrics 
in three areas—safety, revenue, environmental effects—against which to evaluate overall 
regulatory and compliance performance of the offshore oil and gas program. Key measures 
relating to oil spills include barrels spilled per million barrels produced and compliance 
inspections completed (an output rather than outcome measure). Performance results have been 
reported annually in Government Performance and Results Act information and, more recently, 
in Program Assessment Ratings undertaken in conjunction with the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB). Performance fell below targets for the oil spill metric in 2005, largely as a 
consequence of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and in 2008 (Table 2). Compliance inspections fell 
below targets in 2005–2007 (Table 3). Overall, MMS notes that offshore oil and gas activities, 
until the Macondo blowout, resulted in spills totaling less than 0.001 percent of the oil produced 
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Table 2. Bbl Spilled per Million Bbl Produced 
Year Target  Actual 
2002 <10  0.2 
2003 <10  4.2 
2004 <10  8.2 
2005 <10  24.7 
2006 <  5  3.0 
2007 <  5  2.7 
2008 <  5  13.7 
Source: Office of Management and Budget, MMS – Outer Continenal Shelf Minerals 
Regulation and Compliance, Program Assessment Rating, 2008. (Accessed Jan. 9, 2011). 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003715.2005.html 
Overall, MMS notes that offshore oil and gas activities, until the Macondo blowout 
disaster, result in spills of less than 0.001 percent of oil produced over the past 20 years. 
Table 3. Compliance Inspections Completed 
Year Target  Actual 
2002 17,000  22,547 
2003 17,000  23,218 
2004 21,000  24,938 
2005 25,000  23,115 
2006 23,000  20,172 
2007 22,300  20,460 
2008 20,000  25,560 
Source: Office of Management and Budget, MMS – Outer Continenal Shelf Minerals 
Regulation and Compliance, Program Assessment Rating, 2008. (Accessed Jan. 9, 2011). 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003715.2005.html 
MMS (BOEMRE) also tracks fatalities and serious injuries. Fatalities between 2002 and 
2008, as reported in the Program Assessment Rating, averaged 5.8 fatalities per year, meeting 
targets in four of the six years measured (Table 4). The actual goal is 0; the targets listed in Table 
4 reflect improvement goals. MMS asserts that U.S. offshore activities experienced fewer “major 
incidents” than other countries, though it does not cite a source for this assertion.
16 Overall, the 
MMS regulation and compliance program was rated “effective” by OMB in its 2008 review.
17 
   
                                                 
16 Program Assessment Rating Tool report, Outer Continental Shelf Minerals Regulation and Compliance, 2005, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003715.2005.html 
17 Program Assessment Rating Tool report, Outer Continental Shelf Minerals Regulation and Compliance, 2008. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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Table 4. Fatalities  
Year Target  Actual 
2002 N/A  7 
2003 7  11 
2004 7  3 
2005 6  6 
2006 6  9 
2007 6  3 
2008 6  2 
Note: Actual goal is 0, but targets reflect improvement goals. 
Source: Office of Management and Budget, MMS – Outer Continenal Shelf Minerals 
Regulation and Compliance, Program Assessment Rating, 2008. (Accessed Jan. 9, 2011). 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003715.2005.html 
 
MMS also established metrics to assess operator performance, using two indices. The 
first is an operator safety index, which uses a ratio of the weighted “incident” value and the 
number of safety and pollution prevention components inspected during a year. The second is a 
ratio of the operator accident severity value and the component operator count, or number of 
safety components installed in MMS-regulated facilities. MMS then calculates its annual 
composite operator performance index (OPI) based on the number and severity of violations 
cited and accidents reported. Results from 2002 through 2008 are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Operator Performance Index 
Year Target  Actual 
2002 0.20  0.14 
2003 0.20  0.21 
2004 0.20  0.16 
2005 0.20  0.11 
2006 0.20  0.20 
2007 0.20  0.15 
2008 0.20  0.27 
Source: Office of Management and Budget, MMS – Outer Continenal Shelf Minerals 
Regulation and Compliance, Program Assessment Rating, 2008. (Accessed Jan. 9, 2011). 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003715.2005.html 
MMS also calculates an annual composite accident severity ratio based on the number 
and severity of accidents reported (Table 6). Accident data relate to the total number of safety 
and pollution prevention components installed in MMS-regulated facilities. The accident severity 
ratio is a subcomponent of the operator performance index. Reviewing this component separately 
distinguishes changes in the OPI due to decreased accidents versus changes due to changes in 
levels of enforcement activity. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
29 
Table 6. Annual Composite Accident Severity Ratio 
Year Target  Actual 
2002 .08  .04 
2003 .08  .08 
2004 .08  .08 
2005 .08  .03 
2006 .08  .10 
2007 .07  .075 
2008 <.10  .20 
Source: Office of Management and Budget, MMS – Outer Continenal Shelf Minerals 
Regulation and Compliance, Program Assessment Rating, 2008. (Accessed Jan. 9, 2011). 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003715.2005.html 
In the same time period, MMS also tracked the number of serious injuries among workers 
in MMS-permitted activities. The target ranged from 25 to 27, with the upward adjusted goal 
reflecting expected changes in activity levels. Performance exceeded targets in four of seven 
years between 2002 and 2008. The Program Assessment Rating reports that:  
While no single cause for the increase in fatalities and serious injuries in 
FY 2006 from FY 2005 can be identified, the unusual offshore activity level 
during FY 2006 is most likely a significant contributing factor. During FY 2006, 
the offshore industry in the Gulf of Mexico [was] engaged in recovering from the 
record damage caused by hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August and September 
2005. The number of repair operations and man-hours operating on the OCS 
[was] well above that of recent years, dramatically affecting the availability of 
equipment and qualified people to conduct recovery and repair operations.
18  
Despite reasonable performance, OMB’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (known as 
PART) review and other reports note that MMS did not seek regular independent evaluations of 
its performance, including the adequacy of measures used or targets established. The PART 
review notes, “The [regulation and compliance] program has not undergone one comprehensive 
review, and could benefit from a regular-scheduled independent review.”
19 MMS contracted 
periodically for independent reviews of portions of programs and undertook alternative 
management control reviews internally, but it did not systematically seek independent reviews of 
its overall program, performance measures, and program effectiveness. 
The operator performance index shows that the agency met or exceeded the target level 
of performance for seven of nine years during which this measure has been tracked. Yet reviews 
                                                 
18 Office of Management and Budget, MMS – Outer Continenal Shelf Minerals Regulation and Compliance, 
Program Assessment Rating, 2008. 
19 Ibid. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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of events leading to the Macondo well blowout, including a report by the operator, British 
Petroleum, show layers of process and equipment failures. These failures suggest that MMS 
performance measures were missing critical qualitative and quantitative inspection and process 
information that might have pointed to problem performance. In its examination of onshore 
refinery and other workplace chemical incidents, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) notes that “having good numbers on the OSHA … injury logs does not 
correlate with having an effective chemical process safety program.”
20 OSHA offers an example: 
BP–Texas City, where a refinery experienced a disastrous explosion in 2005, “had very good 
injury and illness numbers for its own employees prior to the 2005 explosion. That tragedy, of 
course, revealed serious problems with process safety and workplace culture at the facility.”
21 
Although OSHA’s focus, in this particular assessment, targeted onshore refineries, the agency 
indicates similar challenges in other types of workplace. 
In addition, in its 2009 proposed regulation on Safety and Environmental Management 
Systems (SEMS), MMS reviewed accident panel investigations, conducted a study of 1,443 
incidents in OCS waters from 2001 to 2007, and reviewed incidents of noncompliance. The 
agency concluded that “the data indicate no discernible trend of improvement by industry over 
the past 7 years.”
22 These data are summarized in Tables 7 and 8; E-INC stands for 
environmental incidents of noncompliance. 
Table 7. Ratio of Total Production Operation E-INCs and Number of Components 
Inspected per Year 
Year  Total E-INCs  Components Inspected  Ratio (rounded) 
2001 156  66,065  0.0024 
2002 173  68,355  0.0025 
2003 134  66,056  0.0020 
2004 141  67,267  0.0021 
2005 122  61,520  0.0020 
2006 133  56,930  0.0023 
2006 111  46,384  0.0024 
 
   
                                                 
20 J. Barab, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Testimony on worker safety 
in energy production industries before U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 
Subcommittee on Employment and Workplace Safety, June 10, 2010, press summary, 
http://www/dol.gov/opa/media/press/osha/OSHA20100819.htm (accessed October 9, 2010). 
21 Ibid. 
22 OMB, MMS Program Assessment Rating, 2008. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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Table 8. Ratio of Total Drilling Operation E-INCs and Number of Wells Spud per Year 
Year  Total E-INCs  Wells Spud  Ratio 
2001 19  1,264  0.015 
2002 4    941  0.004 
2003 10    893  0.011 
2004 11    915  0.012 
2005 10    817  0.012 
2006 8    763  0.010 
2007 7    607  0.012 
MMS recognized the limitations of its inspection and oversight practices in a 2006 advance notice 
of proposed rulemaking regarding Safety and Environmental Management Systems. In that advance 
notice, MMS stated that it had “limited methods to verify and document industry compliance with the 
regulatory performance standards.”
23 Safety data and MMS conclusions about safety trends both indicated 
a need for additional or different tools to enhance safety practices within the offshore industry and better 
ways for MMS to assess performance. In addition to proposing a SEMS, MMS also strengthened its focus 
on risk-based inspections and on annual operating reviews, which were intended to focus on operators’ 
compliance records and plans for improvement. 
Performance trends, coupled with incident reports and selected safety assessments, have played 
some role in triggering and shaping regulations. For example, high levels of accidents associated with 
crane operations resulted in additional required procedures for their use on platforms. However, MMS did 
not establish a specific, quantitative safety threshold against which to develop and evaluate safety 
practices and standards. Establishing thresholds refers to the process of transforming “a variable which 
can vary in a continuous manner into one which varies in a binary, dichotomous manner.”
24 In his 
evaluation of voluntary consensus standards, Mark Marpet notes that “thresholding is important because it 
gives decisionmakers a consistent, unambiguous means to decide on a course of action.”
25 Reflecting this 
approach, both Norway and the United Kingdom require that companies specifically identify risks on an 
integrated basis and demonstrate how they are achieving specified safety standards. Both have some 
numerical, risk-based thresholds for use in these risk management processes. 
Internal and external decision triggers. MMS decision criteria that have triggered regulatory 
action include both external and internal drivers. At the time of the Macondo spill, the agency had not 
established a specific, quantitative safety threshold against which to assess current practices and 
                                                 
23 U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, “Oil 
and Gas and Sulphur in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)—Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 
Federal Register 71(98), May 22, 2006, 29277–78. 
24 M. Marpet, “An Ethical Issue in Voluntary-Consensus-Standards Development: A Decision-Science View,” 
Journal of Business Ethics 1(15) (November 1998): 1708. 
25 Ibid., 1708. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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determine the need for additional regulations. Instead, decisions to regulate appear to have resulted from 
iterative review of the following: 
  safety issues, records, and incident reports; 
  review of the American Petroleum Institute (API) Annual Standards Plan and ISO 
standard setting; 
  issues relating to new exploration, production, and technology frontiers; 
  equipment integrity and equipment failure; 
  congressional and other external reviews and reports (until the Macondo blowout, these 
reviews and reports focused almost exclusively on royalty collections and not on safety 
issues); and 
  international oil and gas regulators’ forum discussions. 
Through participation by MMS specialists in the API consensus standard-setting process, 
MMS gained some understanding of safety issues and options for addressing them.
26 
Risk assessment, planning, and safety criteria.
27 The National Research Council (NRC) 
defines risk assessment as a process that involves hazard identification, hazard characterization 
or dose-response assessment, exposure assessment, and risk characterization.
28 
The planning and regulatory context for offshore (especially deepwater) oil and gas 
exploration and production involves both workplace safety hazards and the possibility that oil 
spills will occur, including spills of sufficient scale to damage marine and coastal environments 
and human communities. Assessing and managing these risks are central responsibilities of 
MMS (and its successor bureaus). This risk management occurs in two main clusters of activity: 
(1) the planning and leasing process; and (2) the regulatory process for establishing safety and 
environmental regulations. 
Risk management in planning and leasing process. Through its planning process, MMS 
(BOEMRE) identifies areas eligible for oil and gas leasing in five-year leasing plans and then undertakes 
planning for annual leasing. In both of these stages, MMS (BOEMRE) conducts full environmental 
impact statement analyses. These analyses must include an evaluation of potential environmental, social, 
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and economic impacts. An OCS lease sale can involve “anywhere from 100 to 500 nine-square-mile tracts 
which have been identified as possible production areas by interested oil companies. Also at issue are as 
many as 20 or 30 specific resources which have been identified … as vulnerable to oil spills on the basis 
of research and communication with local authorities.”
29 
Because of the uncertain nature of whether, when, and where an oil spill might occur and how 
significant it might be, the agency uses risk models. In the 1970s, as offshore oil and gas activity 
increased, the U.S. Geological Survey developed an Oil Spill Risk Assessment (OSRA) model to estimate 
probabilities of an oil spill and oil spill contact with important resources.
30 MMS notes, 
[T]he occurrence of oil spills is fundamentally a matter of probability. 
There is no certainty regarding the amount of oil that would be produced, or the 
size or likelihood of a spill that would occur during the estimated life of a given 
lease. Nor can the winds and ocean currents that transport oil spills be known for 
certain. A probabilistic event such as an oil-spill occurrence or oil-spill contact to 
an environmentally sensitive area cannot be predicted, only an estimate of its 
likelihood (its probability) can be quantified.
31  
 
The model that MMS (BOEMRE) uses to assess risk has three basic components: (1) 
estimates of the probability that a spill will occur; (2) simulated trajectories of spills to critical 
environmental resources; and (3) combined results of the first two elements to estimate the risk 
from potential oil development.
32 The model uses historical records of oil spills, ocean currents, 
and wind patterns and has been refined over the years, with periodic efforts to validate it by 
assessing its projections against actual spills. In essence, the model simulates thousands of spills 
at different locations of possible drilling and along pipeline and tanker routes. The model then 
plots the spill trajectory, calculating those trajectories over time and for different spill volumes. 
In addition to its use in NEPA EISs, the OSRA model is used in environmental 
assessments (EAs), oil spill response plans, environmental reports completed by companies, 
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biological opinions for ESA consultations, and other federal agency reports.
33 Any concerns 
about the model and its assumptions thus propagate through almost all oil spill analyses. 
To estimate the probability of an oil spill occurrence, MMS (BOEMRE) maintains data 
on oil spills. Estimates are normalized by volume of oil handled and modeled as a Poisson 
process using historical data.
34 A Poisson process assumes that the number of spills in any time 
interval is not dependent on the number in a preceding interval. This assumption may, however, 
be incorrect if technological or regulatory changes cumulate, affecting spill probabilities. 
Moreover, each time interval must be stationary. A review of relevant data showed a decrease in 
spills over a certain time period, and intervals of relative stationarity were identified.
35 Smith et 
al. note that “while some of the uncertainty [in estimating oil spill risks) reflects incomplete or 
imperfect data, considerable uncertainty is simply inherent in the problem.”
36 
Modeling of oil spill occurrences is challenging. Though small (less than 100 gallons) 
spills are common, high-volume, high-consequence spills are extremely infrequent. The paucity 
of observations of big events makes estimations using data problematic. Nonetheless, even 
though no platform spill of the magnitude of the Macondo blowout had occurred in the Gulf, the 
probability of such an occurrence was not zero. Moreover, oil spill data are “fat tailed”: that is, 
spills greater than 1,000 barrels account for just 0.05 percent of spills but 79 percent of the total 
volume spilled.
37 In this sort of distribution, average spill probabilities have little use, yet they 
have been routinely used in risk assessments. 
The OSRA model has been subject to various technical and analytical critiques. Such 
critiques are important for improving offshore oil and gas management both by companies and 
by regulatory agencies. However, for purposes of understanding risk management in the offshore 
oil and gas context, our focus here is on three broader institutional and decisionmaking issues: 
(1) what formal, regular, and transparent processes exist to periodically review, validate, and 
improve risk models used by the agency and industry; (2) how information is generated by 
models used to inform decisionmaking, including decisions about risk mitigation; and (3) what 
standards, if any, are used as the benchmark or goal for managing and mitigating risk. 
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The model has undergone numerous upgrades and periodic efforts to validate projections 
of spill trajectories and thus potential impacts from a spill.
38 Such efforts have been both regular 
and transparent. In 2003, MMS used satellite-tracked drifters to assess the efficacy of the model. 
Model enhancements occurred in 2004. The broader question is whether the model framework, 
which uses historical data to generate probabilities of a spill, is appropriate for managing 
offshore and coastal resources.  
Concern has persisted in how the model is used to inform decisionmaking. In its 
comments on the 2010–2015 OCS draft five-year plan, for example, the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration recommended that “future project-specific NEPA documents 
should fully evaluate the potential impacts of worst-case scenarios, such as a spill event during 
the summer salmon fisheries or winter crab fisheries.”
39 Because the model projected the 
probability of a high-consequence spill as extremely low, FWS determined that risk of harm to 
ESA-listed species associated with several deepwater oil and gas projects was so low that formal 
consultation under the act was not required. In effect, the initial estimate of extremely low 
probability of a spill has cascading effects on decisionmaking of resource managers. For the 
Macondo well, the risk model generated estimates of 4,600 barrels as the most likely size of a 
large spill and no more than 26,000 barrels of oil spilled over the entire 40-year life of 
production activity on six leases, including the Macondo well site.
40 These estimates resulted in 
an environmental assessment determination of “no significant impact” from the project. 
One challenge of using a risk-based approach to analyze offshore risks is precisely this 
cascading effect. If a risk has very low probability (but potentially catastrophic consequences), 
the probability of adverse impacts may be deemed so low that they are not considered in 
planning and resource management processes. An alternative approach is hazard-based analysis 
of risk, which “examines possible events regardless of their low (or high) likelihood. For 
example, a potential impact would not lose significance because the risk has been reduced due to 
an increase in the level of control, such as engineering standards.”
41 In its 2004 oil spill risk 
analysis, MMS used a hazards-based assessment to attempt to better understand the 
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consequences of a spill. It is not clear, however, how this information was used in subsequent 
planning or ESA consultation documents. 
How risk modeling and associated risk estimates are used raises an important issue. Even 
if the  model is useful for estimating probabilities of a spill and projecting the likelihood that it 
will cause damage, a larger decisionmaking issue looms: how safe is safe enough? Risk models 
themselves do not establish what constitutes “acceptable” or “tolerable” risk. Acceptable risk can 
be defined in various ways, such as when the risk falls below a certain probability or falls below 
some already tolerated risk level, or when the benefits of reducing a risk exceed the costs.
42 A 
central challenge in determining safety policy is whether to set a quantitative risk standard and 
whether and how to use quantitative risk analysis. 
Risk management in setting standards. This aspect of risk management applies both to 
the offshore planning process and to the regulatory processes for establishing safety and 
environmental regulations. According to former MMS officials, the agency looks at both 
quantitative and qualitative risk assessment but generally has favored qualitative approaches.  
For many years, MMS required at least qualitative risk assessments for deepwater 
production facilities in accordance with API Recommended Practice 14j. In addition, API 
Recommended Practice 14c sets forth procedures for “failure analysis” for all production 
facilities. Such procedures, used for production facilities, have not been used for analyzing 
deepwater drilling. Instead, deepwater drilling reviews have traditionally been conducted by a 
single engineer to assess compliance with prescriptive rules rather than to provide any risk 
assessment. 
The rationale for qualitative assessments relates, in part, to data quality. With poor data 
quality, quantitative assessments can be subject to significant manipulation. One MMS former 
manager notes that such manipulation occurred in the early years of using “safety cases” in the 
United Kingdom and elsewhere. For example, one risk assessment for a subsea gas project off 
Australia concluded, based on “failure data” and “consequence assessments,” that use of 
subsurface safety valves was not necessary. According to a reviewer of that risk assessment, the 
operator’s real concern was the cost of installing and maintaining these devices. However, it was 
difficult for the regulator to refute the data used in the assessment. 
In one quantitative risk assessment comparing deepwater production systems, two of the 
five recommendations pertain to data. The report’s second recommendation states,  
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[T]he quality of existing data sets for the Gulf of Mexico should be 
improved so that they are of greater value in future risk analyses. First, the type 
and quality of data that are currently collected should be evaluated, and any 
changes recommended from this evaluation should be implemented in a timely 
manner. Second, single agencies should be responsible for tracking and compiling 
similar types of data. Third, all data records should be reviewed annually by the 
industry and regulators to improve the clarity, quality and usefulness of the 
information in these records. Finally, the data should be published annually in a 
clear and an easily accessible format.
43 
The report’s third recommendation states, 
Additional information about the populations of offshore facilities and 
operations in the Gulf of Mexico should be collected on an annual basis. 
Specifically, the following information from federal and state waters in the Gulf 
of Mexico would be valuable: the length of active pipelines operating per year, 
the number of tanker on-loading and off-loading events in ports and lightering 
zones per year, and the number of man-hours in production-related activities, 
supply vessel operations and tanker operations per year.
44 
Nonetheless, both industry and MMS have, on occasion, strived to quantify risks and use 
quantified comparative risk assessments to evaluate equipment and procedures. For example, a 
2006 study prepared for MMS assessed surface versus subsurface blowout preventers (BOPs) on 
mobile offshore drilling units and provided both quantitative and qualitative comparisons.
45 An 
earlier 2001 study prepared for MMS provided a quantitative risk analysis to assess and compare 
oil spill and fatality risks for four representative deepwater production systems in the Gulf of 
Mexico.
46 
Risk assessment framework. The questions of how safe is safe enough and whether and 
how to quantify, evaluate, or assess risk are recurrent themes among federal regulatory agencies. 
OMB, drawing on discussions of a multiagency Regulatory Working Group, set forth principles 
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for risk analysis in January 1995.
47 The principles were described as “aspirational rather than 
prescriptive.” Agencies were not mandated to follow the principles but instead invited to apply 
them flexibly, using practical judgment. The cover memorandum accompanying the principles 
noted, “The science of risk assessment is rapidly changing and its use is a function of a number 
of factors—including legal mandates and available resources—that vary from one regulatory 
program to another. We therefore do not offer these principles as conclusive, complete or 
irrevocable.”  
The 1995 general principles noted the importance of distinguishing between risk 
identification and risk management policies. Other principles pertained to transparency of 
assumptions and analysis, peer review, consistency, distribution of risks, benefits, and costs, and 
policy criteria. In September 2007, the risk analysis principles were updated by OMB in a new 
memorandum.
48 The new memorandum retained the basic concepts of the 1995 memo but cast 
them as requirements to follow in risk management, consistent with the agencies’ authorities and 
statutes, rather than as aspirational. 
The Department of the Interior participated in the 1995 Regulatory Working Group and 
commented on the 2007 updating of the risk principles. Neither the 1995 principles nor the 2007 
update appears to have prompted significant internal MMS review of its risk analysis and risk 
management.
49 However, because its risk model was developed by the U.S. Geological Survey, 
the model, its assumptions, and its use of data largely met the requirements of those principles.  
The more central issue in MMS’s risk management centers less on the model per se and 
more on is how risk information was used and whether a clear, quantitative safety goal would 
provide greater transparency in its decisionmaking in both planning and setting standards. The 
Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Aviation Administration, Food and Drug 
Administration, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission all have established numerical risk 
thresholds or ranges of tolerable risk. Although numerical thresholds are not essential to risk 
management, they provide a transparent goal against which to benchmark practices, equipment, 
standards, and facilities. Risk analyses can still be compromised by inadequate data and use of 
assumptions that render quantitative risk assessments subject to critique. Nevertheless, 
quantitative goals have the advantage of better enabling independent reviewers to evaluate 
whether a particular standard is likely to meet the specified safety threshold. 
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Role of Costs. Some environmental statutes include specific prohibitions against 
considering costs in setting standards. The laws governing MMS (BOEMRE) do not include 
such provisions. In the API consensus standards process, costs and other commercial issues are 
not explicitly considered. However, because the process bases many standards on proven 
technologies and practices, cost is implicitly a consideration. 
Best Practices. Offshore oil and gas exploration and production are evolving, with new 
development frontiers, materials, processes, and equipment emerging on an ongoing basis. The 
voluntary consensus standard-setting process, by convening energy companies, equipment 
manufacturers, regulators, and others, can enhance awareness of best practices and improved 
technologies. MMS participates in API standard-setting committees, giving agency officials 
access to information about these innovations. However, MMS also systematically contracted 
with outside engineering and other experts to review emergent technologies and undertake 
comparative risk assessments. In some instances, the outcome of these analyses resulted in 
MMS’s opting for new regulations or, in its adoption of API standards, the agency made some 
modifications to those standards.  
Voluntary Consensus Standards Process. Offshore energy exploration and production 
activities include a combination of technical standards for equipment and procedural 
requirements regarding operations and workplace safety. Standard setting varies along three 
dimensions.  
  Type of regulation. The regulations range from prescriptive technological requirements to 
performance standards (in which levels of safety or other qualitative or quantitative 
measures are established and regulated entities then determine implementation). 
  Process by which regulations are established. Whether the standards are performance 
based or prescriptive, the process can range from agency initiation to consensus 
procedures that involve technical experts from the regulated industry, other interested 
parties, and the regulatory agency (or agencies). 
  Approach to regulatory compliance. Measures to assess compliance range from 
traditional agency inspections, used to assess presence of required equipment and 
procedures, to a proactive and risk-based approaches that make the operator accountable 
for ensuring overall safety and risk reduction by identifying hazards and risks, developing 
mitigation strategies and control measures, and demonstrating that the overall system 
meets the standards. 
MMS (and BOEMRE) have relied on a combination of performance-based and 
prescriptive standards. MMS also used a mix of voluntary consensus standards and standards 
developed directly by the agency. The National Technical Transfer and Advancement Act Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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(Public Law 104-113, March 7, 1996) requires government agencies to use industry standards 
when available and when they meet the performance needs of the agencies. The act requires that 
agencies participate in the development of these standards. Consistent with this act, many 
offshore energy exploration and production technical standards are developed through a 
consensus process managed by a standard-setting group within the American Petroleum Institute.  
API is accredited by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), a private, 
nonprofit organization “that oversees development of voluntary consensus standards for 
products, services, processes, systems, and personnel in the United States.”
50 ANSI accredits 
more than 200 organizations as voluntary, consensus standard-setting organizations, with API 
serving as the lead organization in setting many oil and gas technical and process standards. 
Other standard-setting organizations, such as the America Society for Testing and Materials, 
develop some relevant standards, such as those pertaining to fuel.  
API serves both as the petroleum industry’s ANSI-certified voluntary standard-setting 
organization and, through separate activities, as its trade association and lobbying entity. A 
review of 50 organizations on ANSI’s list of accredited standards organizations shows that this 
dual role is not uncommon. Of 50 standard-setting organizations reviewed, nearly half also have 
some form of government relations apparatus. Many, like API, are industry trade associations. 
Accreditation as a voluntary standard-setting organization under ANSI requires 
adherence to various criteria, such as requirements that the standard-setting process be open to 
all interested parties, that non-API parties be eligible to participate, and that certain rules of 
voting and transparency be followed. Consensus does not require unanimity. Rather, consensus 
in API proceedings is defined as a two-thirds majority vote with two-thirds of eligible voters 
actually voting. 
API’s standards relating to drilling for oil and natural gas and production of these 
resources fall into two categories—equipment specifications and recommended practices. In 
addition, API’s standard-setting body issues technical reports on research and other information. 
API standards are used voluntarily by industry except in cases where MMS incorporated the 
standard by reference into regulations. In addition, some companies supplement use of these 
standards with their own internal practices and procedures.  
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Of approximately 262 specifications, recommended procedures, and bulletins in API’s 
exploration and production list, 29 are included in whole or in part by reference in MMS’s 
regulations. These cover such issues as design requirements of risers for floating production 
systems; specifications for wellhead equipment; specifications for subsurface safety valve 
equipment; verification tests of wellhead surface safety valves and underwater safety valves for 
offshore service; installation, maintenance, and repair requirements for surface and underwater 
safety valves; practices for design and hazards analysis for offshore production facilities; and 
recommended practices for blowout prevention equipment. In certain instances, MMS excluded 
part of an API standard or included additional requirements. Consider the following examples: 
  API RP 53, Blowout Prevention Equipment Systems. Operators are required to follow 
only Sections 13.3, 17.10, 17.11, 17.12, 18.10, 18.11, and 18.12, which are incorporated 
into 30 CFR 250.442 and 250.446. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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  API 14G, Fire Prevention and Control. MMS regulations included only Section 5.2, 
which addresses water pumps. 
  API RP 90. MMS included the entire document by reference but added requirements, at 
30 CFR 250.519–530. 
  API Spec 14A. MMS included the entire document by reference but added requirements, 
at 30 CFR 250.806–807.
51 
API seeks balance on its standard-setting committees, striving for one-third of 
participants to be owners or operators, a third to be equipment manufacturers, and a third to 
represent general interests. The last category includes individuals from 10 government agencies, 
three national labs, academia, and other organizations.
52  
MMS (BOEMRE) provides technical specialists, such as production engineers, drilling 
engineers, and structural engineers, as participants in the API voluntary consensus standard-
setting committees and processes. MMS officials note that they had insufficient personnel to 
participate in every standard-setting committee. Consequently, the agency tracks the activities of 
various API standard-setting committees and assigns MMS personnel to participate in those 
deemed significant.
53 Generally, to preserve their federal rulemaking independence, MMS 
participants did not actually vote on final standards.
54 
Participation in the standard-setting committees, according to MMS officials, helped 
MMS understand whether any particular proposed standard presented problems and become 
familiar with debates about performance or other issues. MMS took these issues into account 
when determining whether to adopt a voluntary consensus standard or develop its own standard. 
For example, in discussions regarding standards for subsurface safety values (which operate at 
high temperatures and high pressures), some participants argued for a lower safety factor because 
the equipment was difficult to design and develop. MMS, however, was not comfortable with 
this proposal and required, instead, a case-by-case review of the equipment.
55 
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In 2000, WEST Engineering Services conducted an “Evaluation of the Suitability of 
Industry Standards as MMS Requirements.”
56 The report compared API’s recommended 
practices and the International Association of Drilling Contractors’ deepwater guidelines with 
MMS requirements for safety and environmental performance.
57 In addition, the report surveyed 
20 Gulf of Mexico rigs to assess compliance with recommended items or standards identified in 
the first task of the report. The WEST report found a high level of compliance with 
recommended practices but observed that in some cases operators either were not familiar with 
or did not fully understand the importance of certain safety procedures.
58  
In interviews, industry participants indicate that the consensus process has some element 
of compromise and inconsistent goals. Some goals, for example, are perceived as minimum 
standards; others “reach for the top.” Some firms have pressed to make the voluntary standards 
“best practices.” For example, in development of API Recommended Practice 6, on wellheads, 
some participants pressed to develop high standards that were risk-based, with performance tied 
to environmental conditions, pressure, and other factors: depending on risk conditions, control 
requirements would vary. Some participants in the consensus process believe that choices are 
influenced by who participates. Another observation is that major issues, according to some 
participants, receive greater attention and more emphasis on “best practices” standards.  
Both MMS (BOEMRE) participants and industry participants view the agency’s role as 
significant and reasonably effective. For example, MMS raised the issue of safety valves and 
cooperated through the API process to draw attention to it. The result was a new standard on 
control systems for safety values that requires proof testing and third-party verification of 
equipment. The independent testing was conducted by Southwest Research, which still offers 
testing services. According to several industry technical experts, independent testing is not often 
required, even though many standards require demonstration that the equipment performs 
according to API standards or specifications. Generally, MMS leaves it up to operators or 
purchasers to decide on how to assess whether certain equipment meets required specifications. 
Performance-Based Approach. Though offshore performance for four decades was 
relatively good in terms of environmental releases, in the late 1990s MMS took up two 
conceptual issues regarding safety. First was whether and how to use a performance-based 
approach to safety regulations rather than a prescriptive approach. Second was how to shift more 
responsibility and accountability to companies for their safety and environmental performance. 
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Increasingly, across many industry sectors, including oil and gas, regulatory frameworks 
are moving toward performance standards. The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway notes that 
the transition in Norway began in the late 1970s. Two disasters, a blowout in 1977 and the 
overturning of a mobile rig in 1980 that killed 123 people, led to performance rules that 
emphasized companies’ responsibility to meet stated levels of safety. Norway now uses 
primarily performance-based standards, with some supplemental prescriptive requirements.
59 
 As described in a report delineating differences between U.S. and Norwegian approaches 
to offshore regulation, performance-based regulations involve: 
 
specifying the performance or function which is to be attained or maintained by 
the industry. The regulatory role here involves defining the safety standards which 
companies must meet and checking that they have the management systems 
which permit such compliance. Through a performance-based regulation, the 
companies are given a relatively high degree of freedom in selecting good 
solutions which fulfill the official requirements.
60 
 
The performance approach emphasizes clear safety standards, audits, verification, investigations, 
and significant interaction between industry and the regulator to undertake joint safety studies 
and develop regulations.  
In a prescriptive system, laws and regulations set specific structural, technical 
(engineering and equipment) and procedural requirements as the basis for minimizing 
environmental, health, and safety hazards. Compliance is achieved by installing specified 
structures and equipment, adhering to specified types of training, and following specified 
procedures. Regulatory codes for offshore oil and gas activity in the United States are listed in 
Table 9. 
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Table 9. Primary Federal Regulatory Codes for Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Activities 
Code of Federal 
Regulations Authority  (Agency)  Departmental Head  Authorizing Legislation 
30 CFR 250 “Oil and gas..in 
the OCS” 
Minerals Management 
Service (BOEMRE)  Secretary of the Interior 
Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act 
33 CFR 140-147 “Outer 
Continental Shelf 
Activities”  U.S. Coast Guard 
Secretary of Homeland 
Security 
Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act 
46 CFR “Shipping”  U.S. Coast Guard 
Secretary of Homeland 
Security  Homeland Security Act 
40 CFR “Protection of the 
Environment” 
Environmental Protection 
Agency, other  EPA administrator, other 
Comprehensive Liability, 
Response, and 
Compensation Act; Oil 
Pollution Act 
 
The prescriptive approach as applied to offshore oil and gas activities presents at least 
three challenges: (1) prescribed regulations may lag behind development of new, safer 
equipment and procedures; (2) prescriptions may not cover all relevant behavioral and other 
actions that result in safe performance; and (3) regulators shoulder the primary responsibility for 
inspecting facilities and affirming that they are safe. 
For more than a decade, MMS participated in international and domestic discussions 
about how to enhance offshore regulations and develop a stronger performance rather than 
exclusively prescriptive focus. In 2000, through a new training rule, training requirements shifted 
away from prescribing required courses and hours of training to regulations requiring that 
workers demonstrate ability to perform certain skills.
61 In MMS interviews with 710 employee 
contractors conducted in 2007–2008, after the rule had been in effect for six years, the agency 
received 2 unfavorable and 14 poor ratings.
62 The agency also conducted 30 formal audits 
resulting in issuance of 30 citations for incidents of noncompliance.
63 Using these results, MMS 
clarified training requirements on March 31, 2008, to better specify (1) what contractors were 
covered by the rules; (2) the required frequency of training; (3) the required frequency of 
assessment and skill verification; and (4) the definition of production safety. Related to this 
growing interest in performance regulations was the discussion of how to shift more 
responsibility and accountability to companies for their safety and environmental performance. 
This discussion mirrored developments by other nations engaged in regulating offshore 
activities.  
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Though the details of their approaches differ, Norway and the United Kingdom both use 
a regulatory framework that places overall responsibility on the operator “to ensure a safe and 
prudent operation of the entire [set of] petroleum activities in line with regulations.”
64 The 
approach, as described in a 2010 Norwegian report comparing its practices with those of MMS, 
“requires an active approach where the company needs to identify its own need for control based 
on relevant identified risks, and establish systematic and control measures to ensure compliance 
with those regulations.”
65 The United Kingdom requires operators to develop a “safety case.”  
Sometimes described (somewhat misleadingly) as “self-regulation,” the approach places 
responsibility on the operator (and contractor) to identify risks and hazards; develop controls, mitigation 
strategies, and systems to reduce risks to defined acceptance levels; and use identified risks as the basis 
for prioritizing decisionmaking.
66 The 2010 Norwegian report describes a risk-based system as one in 
which regulations are related to specific risks faced by a company or operator: “safety and contingency 
measures must be commensurate with the risk in each individual activity. The higher the risk, the more 
effort is required and the more wide-ranging measures must be implemented.”
67 The approach is similar 
to that of the United Kingdom, which requires that each operator develop a “safety case” that identifies 
risks on an integrated, system-wide basis, including both technical and procedural (human behavior) 
issues and describes how the operator will address risks and achieve specified safety levels. For both 
Norway and the United Kingdom, risk assessment is a legislative requirement for all new and existing 
installations. 
Although it has not been a U.S. regulatory requirement, some companies that operate in U.S. 
offshore waters use a safety case approach, comprising several practices. First, some firms use outside 
reviewers to examine their risk registries or hazards identification and associated control mechanisms to 
reduce risks. Second, some establish more stringent criteria for equipment design. Shell Oil, for example, 
uses a 1,000-year storm event to assess extension leg platforms, rather than a more typical 100-year storm 
event criterion.
68 Third, some firms verify equipment performance in their own labs rather than relying on 
manufacturer testing and certification. 
A central question for MMS (BOEMRE), as a regulatory agency, is how to stimulate these kinds 
of best practices across all industry participants. In its 2009 proposed regulations on Safety and 
Environmental Management Systems, MMS notes that it cannot adequately ensure safety through 
inspections alone. Particularly in deepwater operations, direct inspections are not possible, and the agency 
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must rely on reviews of logs and monitored information. Moreover, even with expanded numbers of 
inspectors, the thousands of well sites, large number of components, and thousands of workers involved 
in offshore operations make primary reliance on inspections and traditional assessment of compliance 
with prescribed techniques and processes inadequate to ensure safety. There are simply not enough 
inspectors to be everywhere all at once and all the time. These observations have led MMS, the industry, 
and other nations to seek other ways to enhance safety practices and better reinforce self-regulation and 
stronger development of safety cultures within firms. 
Safety and Environmental Management Programs. In the 1990s, MMS began moving toward a 
more performance-based regulatory approach, emphasizing industry adoption of environmental and safety 
management systems and industry accountability for its safety systems and safety performance. As early 
as 1991, MMS “introduced the concept of a Safety and Environmental Management Program (SEMP) 
with the goal of having operators in the offshore industry voluntarily adopt an active safety and 
environmental management approach in conducting operations.”
69 
In response to this focus, API developed Recommended Practice 75, pertaining to Safety and 
Environmental Management Systems, which includes 12 elements:
70 
  safety and environmental information; 
  hazards analysis; 
  management of change; 
  operating procedures; 
  safe work practices; 
  training; 
  assurance of quality and mechanical integrity of critical equipment; 
  pre-startup review; 
  emergency response and control; 
  investigation of incidents; 
  audit of safety and environmental management program elements; and 
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  documentation and recordkeeping. 
After API Recommended Practice 75 was written, MMS worked with the offshore 
industry to develop a prototype Safety and Environmental Management Program and protocols 
for performance auditing. From 1994 through 1998, MMS monitored the industry’s voluntary 
implementation of these systems to gauge the degree of adoption. In addition, MMS held annual 
performance reviews with operators to examine compliance history, reviewing results of MMS 
inspections, actions under civil penalty review, and actions that resulted in civil penalties. More 
than half of incidents reviewed pertained to behavioral issues associated with operating 
procedures and management of change. Results of these reviews and other industry discussions 
led to a rewriting of API Recommended Practice 75 “to incorporate concepts from the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001—Environmental Management 
Systems.”
71 
In 2006, MMS put forth an advance notice of a proposed rulemaking in which it 
announced an objective of improving the regulatory system and industry performance by 
mandating that operators use an integrated system for environmental management and 
performance. The announcement, and eventual proposed rule issued in June 2009, focused on 4 
of the 12 elements of API Recommended Practice 75: hazards analysis, operating procedures, 
mechanical integrity, and management of change.  
MMS focused on those four elements after reviewing panel investigation reports of 
incidents, analyzing incidents, and analyzing noncompliance (Table 10). These reviews showed 
the major performance weaknesses and causes contributing to accidents. In addition, analysis of 
accidents identified six contributing causes: (1) lack of communication between operator and 
contractor(s); (2) lack of understanding of job hazards analysis prior to beginning work or lack of 
hazards analysis written procedures; (3) onsite supervision not enforcing existing procedures or 
practices; (4) lack of written safe work procedural guidelines; (5) integrity of facilities and 
equipment not maintained according to recommended practices; and (6) workplace hazards not 
identified and corrected.
72 As in the incident panel reviews, three of these six issues related 
directly to workplace behavior; the other three at least indirectly also related to behavioral issues 
and practices. In a review of 310 incidents that occurred in OCS waters in 2003 and 2004, with 
13 fatalities and 97 injuries, the majority involved at least one of the four elements MMS 
targeted in its proposed rulemaking on Safety and Environmental Programs. 
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Change Injuries Fatalities 
2005-027    X X X    
2005-007    X X      
2004-078  X X   X   1 
2004-075  X X X      
2004-048        
2004-046  X X   X 3   
2004-004  X      1 
2003-068   X      
2003-046   X   X    
2003-023        
2002-076  X   X     1 
2002-075  X    X   1 
2002-062     X  2  1 
2002-059  X   X X 1  1 
2002-040    X     
2001-084     X    
2001-045    X X     1 
2001-042  X   X X   1 
2001-010  X    X  1   
2001-009   X   X    
2001-005  X    X    
2000-089  X   X     1 
 
The 2006 advance notice of proposed rulemaking and subsequent 2009 proposed 
rulemaking are illuminating. MMS notes in these documents that it issued hundreds of incident 
reports annually and that it perceived “no discernible trend of improvement by industry over the 
past 5 years. The number of notices of incidents issued concerning maintenance of pollution 
inspection records have continually increased from 2000–2005.”
73 MMS concludes in the 
advance notice that “our current approach to environmental protection does not allow us to 
ascertain the level of industry compliance with all applicable environmental laws, regulations, 
and lease stipulations. We believe that industry’s SEMS plan should contain processes and 
protocols for detailing their compliance with these requirements.”
74 It was similar concerns that 
some years earlier had prompted Norway to shift to a performance-based environmental 
management approach.  
The proposed SEMS rule issued in June 2009 included provisions requiring offshore 
operators to develop Safety and Environmental Management Systems consisting of the 4 
elements identified earlier in the 2006 advance notice. Many comments on that advance notice 
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viewed the voluntary application of API Recommended Practice 75 as sufficient. Others 
commented on MMS’s perceived lack of capacity to approve SEMS plans and argued for third-
party certification. Some indicated that the 12 elements of Recommended Practice 75 were 
integrated parts of a total system and that requiring just 4 of the 12 could undermine fully 
integrated approaches to environmental and safety management. The rule, however, did not 
preclude use of all 12 elements; rather, the other 8 elements would remain part of any voluntary 
compliance with the recommended practice.  
The proposed rule, addressing the issue of oversight, required that each lessee and 
operator have its SEMS audited at least every three years by an independent third party or by 
qualified personnel within the company. Under the proposed rule, MMS would provide 
additional oversight through periodic audits—announced or unannounced evaluations with MMS 
personnel and/or third parties. Poor performance was indicated as a potential trigger for an MMS 
evaluation of the SEMS. 
In comments on the proposed rule, API stated support for the existing voluntary system. 
In the context of the Macondo well blowout, of particular note is that British Petroleum stated 
that it already had a system in place that included the four elements addressed in the new 
regulation and proposed revisions to the rule; its own system, it said, would give operators 
greater flexibility in administration, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements. BP also opposed 
requirements that equipment be maintained in conformity with manufacturers’ requirements, 
stating instead that BP had adopted risk-based inspection and testing requirements.  
On October 15, 2010, MMS issued the final SEMS rule, with one major change from the 
proposed rule: MMS incorporated by reference the entire API Recommended Practice 75, 
including the general procedures and 12 elements of the API Safety and Environmental 
Management System. The change occurred in part because many comments noted that the 
system needed to be viewed as an integrated whole.   
International Practices: Information Exchanges. The offshore oil and gas industry 
operates in an international context. An International Regulators Forum periodically brings 
together MMS and regulators from other nations, along with the private sector, to evaluate 
technologies, regulatory practices, and related topics. In addition, the International 
Standardization Organization (ISO) develops some standards relevant to offshore oil and gas 
exploration and production. Around 70 percent of these ISO standards are the same as or 
equivalent to API standards. In many instances, the API standards are used as the base 
documents for establishing ISO standards, with modifications as appropriate to an international 
setting. In other areas, such as for LNG facilities, ISO plays the lead role in standards 
development.Budget: The MMS budget for revenue management and compliance (royalty 
collections) has grown much faster than either the budget for inspections or the budget for 
leasing and environment (Figures 10 and 11). In 1984 (the earliest year for which data are Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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available), the agency’s budget for revenue management was 9 percent larger than the regulatory 
budget. By 2010 it was 48 percent larger, perhaps reflecting continual focus on the royalty 
program by congressional and other independent reviewers. The royalty program has been the 
subject of numerous criticisms by Interior’s inspector general, Congress, the General 
Accountability Office, and other observers, even before it transitioned from USGS to the newly 
formed Minerals Management Service in 1982. 
The size of the budget for revenue activity relative to regulatory activity grew steadily 
throughout the mid-80s, stabilized from about 1989 to 1994, and then grew again (Figures 10 
and 11). The discrepancy between the two peaked in 1997, when the budget for revenue 
activities was more than twice that for regulatory activities. The gap then narrowed. Since 2005, 
the revenue management budget has been around 1.5 times the size of the regulatory budget. The 
budget for leasing and environment has fluctuated, too, but over time has more or less grown (in 
nominal terms) at a rate similar to the regulatory budget.  
Additionally, the budget for oil spill research has actually shrunk by 22 percent in real 
dollars since oil spill research first appeared as a separate subactivity, in 1993.  
 
Figure 10. Trends in MMS Budget Components, Nominal Dollars, 1984–2010  
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Figure 11. Trends in MMS Budget Components, 2010 Dollars, 1984–2010 
 
Agency Structure and Capacity 
Organization Structure. Structuring and coordinating the various activities associated 
with offshore oil and gas exploration and production have long been challenges for the 
Department of the Interior. Before 1982, when MMS was created, resource assessments, safety 
oversight, and royalty collection were handled by the U.S. Geological Survey. Leasing was 
handled by the Bureau of Land Management. Coordination problems prompted the temporary 
creation of a coordinating role in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management 
and Budget. Establishment of MMS was, in part, designed to overcome these coordination 
challenges, as well as to improve capacity for royalty assessment and collection. The newly 
created MMS was designed primarily along regional geographic lines, with vertical oversight 
provided between headquarters, regions, and districts. The structure had two effects: safety and 
leasing functions were combined under single supervisory authority, and safety and 
environmental personnel were pulled from district offices that handled day-to-day offshore 
permitting and review functions and placed, instead, at the regional level.  
All organizational design structures involve trade-offs. Structuring along functional lines 
(e.g., safety, leasing, and royalty collections) can enhance focus on the individual functions and 
their independent requirements but present coordination challenges among interlinked activities. 
Throughout its existence, MMS faced some criticism that a functional organization structure 
would better ensure equal (and independent) focus on the three main areas. Notably, a major 
difference between U.S. and Norwegian management of offshore activities was in organization 
structures. In Norway, authorities for leasing and resource management are in one organization, 
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Order 3299, U.S. offshore operations now resemble the Norwegian structure, in which safety and 
leasing operations are segregated into different organizations. 
Peer Review and Analysis. MMS uses several organizations and processes to provide 
some outside advice, peer review, and assessment of its activities. However, MMS does not have 
regular and formal procedures for conducting peer review of its risk models, safety standards, 
and regulations. Advisory and review functions cluster into two main categories: use of advisory 
committees and contracting with outside academic or other experts to perform risk assessments 
and other reviews. In addition, MMS assembles incident panels to evaluate offshore accidents 
that result in fatalities or significant oil spills. 
MMS (BOEMRE) maintains three advisory committees: the OCS Policy Committee, the 
OCS Scientific Committee, and the Royalty Policy Committee. All three committees are 
advisory and are not responsible for directly making or executing policy. Voting members of 
these committees are appointed by the secretary of the Interior. The committees also include ex 
officio nonvoting members (e.g., certain coastal state governors and heads of certain federal 
agencies participate on the policy committee, and BLM participates on the Royalty Policy 
Committee). Guidelines for selecting voting members appear in the committee charters, but these 
guidelines are not binding. The Policy Committee and Royalty Policy Committee include various 
stakeholders. The Policy Committee also is to have a representative from each state with 
offshore oil and gas leases, as well as representatives from other stakeholders, such as major oil 
producers, small oil companies, the environmental community, local government, and 
consumers. The Royalty Policy Committee is to have representatives from affected states, Native 
American groups, mineral and energy companies, and public interest groups. Criteria for 
members of the Science Committee concern scientific competence. The committees meet once or 
twice each year, receive informational presentations from MMS, and from time to time issue 
resolutions or recommendations to MMS.  
Unlike EPA, MMS does not appear to have prescribed requirements for conducting peer 
review. The agency has contracted on numerous occasions with various academic experts and 
other consultants to undertake quantitative risk assessments of different technologies, review 
MMS regulations for adequacy, and other tasks. MMS conducts incident panels but manages 
these panels internally. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act requires MMS (BOEMRE) or the 
Coast Guard to investigate and report on all deaths, serious injuries, major fires, and major oil 
spills related to OCS exploration, development, and production.75 Because of intersecting 
jurisdictions, in March 2009 MMS and the Coast Guard signed a memorandum of agreement 
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spelling out the circumstances under which each agency would take the lead in conducting an 
investigation.76 Unlike FAA, for which the independent National Transportation Safety Board 
investigates airplane crashes and related safety incidents, both MMS and the Coast Guard 
undertake their own incident investigations.  
Training Requirements and Practices. Industry analyst Paul Sonneman notes that 
“Serious well control problems in the field are more often the result of inappropriate human 
behavior than of any other single cause.”77  Of seven elements identified as contributing to the 
2010 Macondo well disaster by the Deepwater Horizon Study Group at the Center for 
Catastrophic Risk Management, five can be considered “failures in administrative controls—
Human and Organization Factor (HOF) malfunctions.”78 Administrative control failures include 
“deviation from standard operating procedures …, failure to follow accepted well completion 
procedures, failure to respond to trouble indicators, failure to maintain [emergency shutdown and 
disconnect] systems, and failure to fully test and activate the [blowout preventers].”79  
Four years earlier, in its 2006 proposed rulemaking on Safety and Environmental 
Management Systems (SEMS), MMS’s rationale seems to have anticipated these human failures. 
For that proposed rulemaking, MMS reviewed 310 OCS incidents (including fatalities, injuries, 
loss of well control, collisions, fires, pollution, and crane events) that occurred in 2003 and 2004. 
Of these incidents, 159, or more than half, involved failures to follow proper operating 
procedures; 13 involved poor management of change. Together, these failures accounted for 51 
percent of the incidents reviewed.  
Training and Performance Assessment. Although training alone cannot address those 
types of failure, workforce training, capacity, and competence of agency, contractor, and 
industry personnel contribute to the human factor in safety performance. MMS regulations 
require training of all personnel of the agency, lessees, operators, and contractors. Those 
requirements shifted from prescriptive requirements—number of hours of training, specific 
course requirements, and testing to performance standards—when MMS found that participation 
in specified training activities did not necessarily result in good performance.80 Once 
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performance requirements were instituted, operators became accountable for showing their 
employees’ ability to perform. According to one former MMS safety official, the shift to 
performance standards yielded significant improvements in workers’ performance. Under the 
performance-based approach to training, MMS intended to use random inspections, tests and 
drills, and incident analysis to validate workers’ skills. Six years after implementing the new 
training rules, MMS interviewed the regulated community and undertook audits to assess the 
effectiveness of the new training rule and, as a result of those evaluations, issued clarifying 
information and definitions. 
Interviews with both industry and agency personnel, as well as a review of training 
literature and reports, point to ongoing inadequacies in current training practices. Among the 
issues raised were: 
  Lack of cross-training. One study in Australia showed that most oil rig workers who 
performed cementing tasks did not know that one-third of blowouts were due to 
cementing problems. Similar deficiencies in cross-training, according to former MMS 
officials, also exist in U.S. offshore oil and gas operations. 
  Inadequate reinforcement of safety behavioral incentives. Many workers may know the 
technical procedures for well control but fail to respond to danger signals with work 
stoppages or other proper responses. “Year after year,” writes one industry observer, “we 
hear of well control situations resulting from, or complicated by, a dramatic failure of 
trained rig personnel to perform [a] simple sequence of behaviors in a timely fashion.”81 
Though this comment was written in 1992, recent interviews with agency and industry 
experts reveal that such problems continue. 
A recent report on oceanographic professionals, including those working in offshore oil 
and gas operations, addressed licensing and certification programs.82 Neither the oil and gas 
industry nor the agency requires certifications for engineers (though they do require bachelor’s 
degrees). In the interview process for the report, some offshore oil and gas professionals 
expressed concern that certification would limit the pool of eligible applicants.  
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Regulatory Enforcement 
Compliance Record: In its 2000 survey of 20 Gulf of Mexico rigs to determine 
compliance with recommended items or standards, WEST Engineering Services concluded that 
“in general, the rigs surveyed had a very high level of compliance with MMS and industry 
standards. Rigs surveyed had a total of 934 compliances with assessment points and 55 that were 
not in compliance.”83 The report noted that some instances of noncompliance were in rigs built 
before a particular standard was developed. In other instances, rig operators were in the process 
of bringing their rigs into compliance but had not completed the work. However, the survey also 
showed instances in which noncompliance was associated with a rig contractor’s incomplete 
knowledge. For example, “some drilling contractors had not fully considered the ramifications of 
a single BOP control hose between a shuttle value and the BOP. Failure would render the BOP 
control system inoperative, constituting a ‘single point failure’ and therefore a lack of 
compliance with this API RP.”84 
In summary, the WEST survey of MMS regulations, notices to lessees, and safety alerts 
noted that compliance of surveyed items was observed 84.8 percent of the time; and in some 
cases, API recommended practices were more stringent than MMS OCS regulations. 
Inspections and Violations. MMS (BOEMRE) inspects OCS drilling and production 
activities to ensure compliance with federal law, federal regulations, lease and right-of-way 
agreements, and approved exploration, development, and production plans. According to MMS 
regulations, these inspections are particularly concerned with verifying that equipment designed 
to prevent blowouts, spills, fires, and other accidents has been installed and is operating properly. 
85  
Regulations specify that both scheduled and unscheduled inspections are to be 
conducted.86 MMS is required to conduct a scheduled inspection of each facility at least once a 
year and to conduct unscheduled inspections “periodically.”87 Recent reporting by the Wall 
Street Journal indicated that MMS rarely conducts unscheduled inspections.88  
Inspections of offshore facilities are either “complete” inspections or “sample” 
inspections. A complete inspection scrutinizes all of a facility’s safety system components and 
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also checks for compliance with “current plans, lease terms, and appropriate stipulations.” A 
sample inspection examines a random sample of safety devices or components. MMS policy 
states that both quantitative and qualitative assessments are to be used to determine which 
facilities are subjected to unscheduled inspections and whether any scheduled or unscheduled 
inspection should be a complete or sample inspection. Some inspection data obtained from MMS 
list a third kind of inspection, a “partial” inspection, the nature of which is not detailed in the 
MMS manual.89 
MMS inspection guidelines list 136 criteria for inspectors to examine.90 These criteria are 
called potential incidents of noncompliance, or PINCs. Not every PINC is applicable to every 
offshore operation. Some apply only to specific types of operation (exploration, drilling, 
production, pipelines, or renewable energy development), and some are applicable only during 
certain phases of operation (such as initial drilling or decommissioning). Many aspects of the 
drilling and production operation (such as well tests and periodic operator-conducted safety 
inspections) are not directly observed by the inspector. In such cases, the inspector’s job is to 
review the operator’s logs and records to verify compliance with required procedures.91 
If a component or procedure does not meet the standards specified in the PINC list, the 
operator can be issued a notice for an incident of noncompliance. An INC can take one of three 
forms: a warning, issued when a violation poses no immediate danger to personnel or equipment; 
a component INC, issued when a specific location or piece of equipment poses an immediate 
danger, and the location or equipment in question can be shut down without affecting the overall 
safety of the facility; or a structure INC,  issued when an unsafe situation poses an immediate 
danger to the personnel or facility, and the location or equipment in question cannot be shut 
down without affecting the overall safety of the facility. Component or structure INCs can result 
in component or structure shut-ins, respectively, in which the unsafe component or facility is 
removed from service until the unsafe situation is remedied.92  
In certain circumstances, an INC can lead to civil penalties (i.e., fines) and even criminal 
penalties. According to the MMS manual, a review for potential civil and criminal penalties is 
triggered by violations that cause injury, death, or environmental damage or pose a threat to 
human life or the environment. Examples of circumstances that trigger a review for civil and 
criminal penalties include unsafe and unworkmanlike conditions involving injury to humans or 
pollution; safety devices that are bypassed or removed without a valid reason; and inoperable 
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safety devices that are left in service without repair. Additionally, any violation that is not 
corrected within the timeframe specified by MMS, or any instance of an operator’s failing to 
maintain evidence of financial responsibility up to its maximum legal liability, is to be reviewed 
for potential civil or criminal penalties. Note that each of these circumstances triggers a review 
for civil and criminal penalties, which may or may not result in actual assessment of a penalty.93 
From 1998 to 2010, 64,173 inspection visits of offshore production facilities were 
conducted by MMS, or an average of 4,936 per year. Of those inspection visits, 37,842, or 59 
percent, were full inspections; 10,360, or 16 percent, were partial inspections; and 15,971, or 25 
percent, were sample inspections. A total of 46,977 INC notices were issued, or an average of 
3,614 per year (multiple INCs can be issued in the course of a single inspection). Of those INC 
notices, 22,897, or 49 percent, were warning notices; 22,285, or 47 percent, were component 
shut-ins; and 1,795, or 4 percent, were structure shut-ins.94 
From 1998 to 2010, 21,866 inspection visits of offshore drilling rigs were conducted by 
MMS, or an average of 1,682 per year. Data on whether these were full, partial, or sample 
inspections are not available. A total of 2,926 INCs were issued, or an average of 225 per year. 
Of those INC notices, 1,782, or 61 percent, were warning notices; 582, or 20 percent, were 
component shut-ins; and 562, or 19 percent, were structure shut-ins.95 
Of the 49,903 INC notices that were issued between 1998 and 2010, only 443, or less 
than 1 percent, resulted in civil penalties, for an average of 34 per year. The smallest fine issued 
was $3,000, the largest was $810,000, and the median penalty was $20,000. Of penalties 
assessed, 360 (or 81 percent) were between $3,000 and $50,000, and 40 (or 9 percent) were for 
$100,000 or more. The most common penalty was $10,000.  
The five largest fines assessed were for the following offenses: a firewater system was 
inoperable for 81 days ($810,000); a well was producing with casing pressure for 279 days after 
a request to do so was specifically denied by MMS ($697,500); an operator had multiple 
violations, including two missed annual crane inspections, a missed gas detection system test, 
several other missed equipment tests, failure to fix a leaking subsurface safety valve for 17 
months, and failure to fix heliport skirting for 29 months ($525,000); an entire platform safety 
system was bypassed to keep production online, resulting in two pollution incidents, one of 
which caused a 12-square-mile oil slick ($505,000); and an operator failed to replace two leaking 
subsurface safety valves for 186 and 365 days, respectively ($467,950).  
                                                 
93 MMS Manual 650.2. 
94 MMS inspection data obtained by Resources for the Future. 
95 MMS inspection data obtained and analyzed by Muehlenbachs et al. (2011). Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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Examples of violations that were assessed the most common penalty, $10,000, included 
an open hole that led to mud tanks with no guardrails; bypass of the relief valve on a production 
water skimmer; and failure to secure a hatch, resulting in a falling accident.96  
The figures reported in the agency’s Program Assessment Rating (PART), discussed 
above, show a much higher number of compliance inspections conducted per year. This is 
because the PART figures include inspections of other types of facilities, such as pipelines, and 
also because more than one type of inspection may be conducted in the course of a single 
inspection visit. For example, on a single visit, inspectors may perform a water quality inspection 
for EPA; a full, partial, or component inspection of drilling equipment as discussed above; and a 
check of Coast Guard–mandated safety equipment such as life jackets. Each of those activities 
would be considered a separate inspection for the purposes of the Program Assessment Rating 
Tool.  
Despite relatively high levels of compliance, safety incidents and small spills prompted 
MMS several years ago to begin testing risk-based approaches to inspections. Under this 
approach, the agency developed the following criteria, associated with higher risks97: 
  manned (versus unmanned) platforms; 
  gas production; 
  volume of production; 
  operator performance based on prior inspections; 
  district reports on operators with compliance issues; and 
  platforms with gathering of flow lines crossing the facility. 
This risk-based inspection approach will evolve as the new agency hires additional 
inspectors and revises inspection protocols.  
Main Points about MMS (BOEMRE)  
Before it was reorganized in the aftermath of the Macondo blowout, the Minerals 
Management Service was responsible for three related but very different missions: (1) the leasing 
of offshore parcels for oil and gas exploration and production; (2) the regulation of offshore 
production and the enforcement of safety and environmental regulations; and (3) the distribution 
                                                 
96 MMS Civil Penalty Data: http://www.BOEMRE.gov/civilpenalties/index.htm. 
97 W. Cruickshank, Deputy Director, BOEMRE, email to L. Scarlett, September 11, 2010. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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of offshore leases and the collection and administration of royalties. Given the relatively low 
incidence of large oil spills since the founding of MMS, and given national policies focused on 
energy production and the resulting revenue, over time proportionately more financial resources 
were dedicated to lease administration and revenue enforcement than to safety and 
environmental enforcement. Royalty collection and management also drew the lion’s share of 
oversight from both the executive and the legislative branches. The reorganization of these 
functions following the Macondo incident has segregated leasing, revenue collection, and safety 
and environmental enforcement into separate offices to give independent budget, planning, and 
management focus to each function. However, with the reorganization still in progress, several 
important issues remain unresolved, including how to ensure coordination across these 
intersecting functions and separate agencies, and how to strengthen on-the-ground safety 
management capacity.  
As the newly formed bureaus work on reducing risks and enhancing safety, several areas 
merit particular focus. These include: 
  use of peer review and independent analysis of risk management and standards; 
  strengthening of operator accountability to articulate risk goals and detail how practices 
and technologies achieve those goals, both in general and at specific exploration and 
production sites; 
  methods for enhancing safety performance of operators, including issues pertaining to 
types of training, identification of poor performance, and methods to ensure corrective 
action; and 
  methods for reporting data on incidents, compliance, and performance. 
3. Federal Aviation Administration 
Background 
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 created the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as 
a separate entity to provide “for the regulation and promotion of civil aviation in such manner as 
to best foster its development and safety, and to provide for the safe and efficient use of the 
airspace by both civil and military aircraft.”98 According to its current mission statement, FAA 
seeks to provide “the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world.”99 FAA’s 
                                                 
98 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Public Law 85-726. 
99 www.faa.gov/about/mission/.  Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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responsibilities include establishing regulations to protect safety for a wide range of aviation-
related activities, including commercial aviation, air cargo, general civil aviation, and 
commercial aerospace. FAA’s FY 2009 budget was $15 billion. Roughly $10 billion was 
authorized for the Air Traffic Organization and $2 billion was authorized for safety and 
operations. The total full-time equivalent (FTE) for FAA was roughly 41,000 positions.100 This 
discussion will focus on FAA regulation of the commercial (regularly scheduled flights) aviation 
sector. 
The commercial aviation industry experiences fatal accidents almost every year. The 
effects of a fatal accident are internalized within the industry in the sense that the companies 
involved in an accident are subject to tort liability and loss in market share—effects that may 
have a dramatic effect on their revenue and stock price and even their viability. There is also 
evidence that fatal accidents have spillover effects for the industry as a whole.101 In addition, the 
air crew has a strong, personal interest in aviation safety.102 The organizations representing the 
air crew provide an important, independent perspective in the regulatory process.103 
As a consequence, this is an industry that is very sensitive to safety concerns. Industry 
concern with safety has implications for FAA regulation because it supports a high degree of 
cooperation between the regulated firm and the agency. 
As one example of this cooperative approach, FAA and industry formed the Commercial 
Aviation Safety Team (CAST) in 1998 with the goal of reducing fatal commercial accidents by 
80 percent by 2007.104 CAST is a cooperative government-industry organization, co-chaired by 
an FAA associate administrator and an industry representative. Members include several U.S. 
government agencies, representatives of the employee organizations (e.g., Airline Pilots 
                                                 
100 www.faa.gov/office_org/headquarters_offices/aba/budgets_brief/media/2010_budget_highlights.pdf.  
101 J.C. Bosch, E.W. Eckard, and V. Singal, “The Competitive Impact of Air Crashes: Stock Market Evidence,” 
Journal of Law and Economics 41(2) (October 1998), 503–19. See also D.A. Carter and B.J. Simkins, “The 
Market’s Reaction to Unexpected Catastrophic Events: The Case of Airline Stock Returns and the September 11th 
Attacks,” The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 44 (2004): 539–58. 
102 There is a long tradition within the industry of relying on the independent judgment of the pilot in determining 
whether it is safe to fly.  
103 As one indicator of the influence of the air crew on aviation safety, the FAA administrator—J. Randolph 
Babbitt—began his career as a pilot for Eastern Airlines. He has served as President and CEO for the U.S. Airlines 
Pilots Association, the world’s largest professional organization of airline pilots. In fact, the administrators of the 
FAA have generally been pilots—with the exception of the two immediate predecessors to Administrator Babbitt. 
Administrators with experience as pilots bring their unique perspective to the importance of continuing to improve 
airline safety. 
104 www.cast-safety.org/about_background.cfm.  Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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Association), aircraft manufacturers, and the air carriers.105 Since 1998, CAST has analyzed data 
from hundreds of fatal accidents and thousands of incidents to identify and recommend safety 
enhancements. Although CAST has recommended a few changes in FAA regulations, it has 
primarily served an extraregulatory function, with most of its recommendations providing 
suggested changes to FAA guidance and procedure documents. Now in its second decade, CAST 
is shifting to a “proactive” approach—assessing emerging risks before accidents occur—rather 
than the “reactive” approach of reviewing data from accidents and incidents.106 
As another indicator of the level of cooperation between FAA and the industry, FAA 
staff report that the industry generally does not challenge major FAA safety rules in the courts. A 
survey of the three major aviation safety rules issued by FAA in the past 10 years indicates that 
none of these rules were challenged in the D.C. Circuit.107  
FAA also operates in a regulatory context with significant oversight by Congress and 
other federal agencies. Over the past five years, Congress has held more than 20 hearings on 
FAA safety issues and requested and received more than 10 reports by GAO on various safety 
issues.108 In August, President Obama signed the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation 
Administration Extension Act of 2010, which requires FAA rulemaking in at least six areas 
concerned with flight personnel qualifications and training, crew pairing, and fatigue. Of 
particular importance, the act instructs FAA to require that commercial air carriers implement a 
safety management system (SMS, discussed further below).109 It also requires FAA to report 
annually to Congress the status of its review of recommendations from the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).110 
                                                 
105 www.cast-safety.org/members.cfm. 
106 FAA, The Federal Aviation Administration: A Historical Perspective, 1903–2008, Chapter 9, 147, 
www.faa.gov/about/history/historical_perspective/. 
107 We did identify two challenges in the D.C. Circuit during this period, but neither involved a recently completed 
FAA safety rule. In one, a pilots group challenged a longstanding FAA rule—adopted in the 1950s—requiring pilots 
to retire at age 60. After the court upheld the FAA rule, the President signed legislation in 2007 changing the 
mandatory age for pilots to age 65. In the other case, a group of airlines filed suit in 2008 arguing that ultra-long-
haul flight time and rest operational guidance issued by FAA should have been established through notice-and-
comment rulemaking. FAA is now in the process of going through a notice-and-comment rulemaking that includes 
these flight time and rest requirements. 75 FR 55852 (September 14, 2010).  
108 House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, http://transportation.house.gov/hearings/; Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=AviationOperationsSafetyandSecurity. 
109 Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, Section 215. SMS is defined by the 
act as the program established by FAA in Advisory Circular No. 120-92 (June 22, 2006). 
110 Ibid., Section 202.  Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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Congress established NTSB in 1967 as an independent agency with the mission of 
promoting a high level of safety within the transportation system. NTSB was originally placed in 
the Department of Transportation (DOT) for administrative purposes, but in 1974, Congress 
established NTSB as a completely separate entity to conduct accident investigations functions 
“totally separate and independent from any other … agency of the United States.” NTSB 
investigates accidents and major incidents to determine probable causes and makes 
recommendations for changes in rules and procedures. It also conducts safety studies and 
evaluates the effectiveness of regulatory programs for the transportation agencies. Finally, it 
reviews the appeals of enforcement actions taken by FAA involving aviation certificates and 
appeals of FAA civil penalty actions.111 
Regulatory Actions 
FAA is responsible for developing and maintaining regulations that promote aviation 
safety. Regulations are developed through a rulemaking process subject to the requirements of 
the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946. As discussed above, this process involves notice of a 
proposed rule, an opportunity for public comment, and publication of a final rule. Draft proposed 
and final rules that are designated “significant” must be submitted by FAA to the Office of the 
Secretary in DOT. After the Office of the Secretary completes its review, these draft proposed 
and final rules must be submitted to OMB for Executive Order 12866 review. Major rules—that 
is, rules with expected annual benefits or costs that exceed $100 million—also require a 
completed regulatory analysis.112 (See Figure 12 for a schematic of the FAA regulatory 
development process.)  
Over the past 10 years, FAA has published seven major rules; three directly address 
aviation safety (see Table 11). Of the remaining four rules, three are “economic” rules concerned 
with the allocation of slots at some of the nation’s busiest airports. The Washington, DC 
Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area is a security rule. 
                                                 
111 www.ntsb.gov/Abt_NTSB/history.htm . 
112 The economic office begins the regulatory impact analysis early in the rule development process but only after 
options have been identified and sufficient information has been generated to prepare the analysis. The economic 
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Overall, FAA published 16 final rules in 2008 and 17 in 2009. FAA staff report that the 
FAA is able to carry roughly 40 to 45 rulemaking projects at the same time.
113 The agency 
prioritizes its rulemaking initiatives and projects in the context of a four-year timeframe. Given 
the time required for rule development, this translates into roughly 15 final rules per year.  
Many of FAA’s rules are the result of initiatives generated internally by the agency’s 
program offices. Some rules have been initiated in response to recommendations from CAST or 
other FAA advisory committees, NTSB recommendations, or occasionally statutory mandates 
adopted by Congress. A small fraction represents the FAA response to international agreements 
and efforts to address safety and harmonize requirements for equipment, personnel, and 
operations. 
FAA also uses airworthiness directives as a regulatory instrument. Airworthiness 
directives, used only to address “unsafe conditions,” constitute rulemaking and are 
enforceable;
114 they are prepared and published in the Federal Register by the program office. 
These directives are not subject to review by DOT, the Office of the Secretary of DOT, or 
Executive Order 12866. Although some go through notice-and-comment rulemaking, many are 
completed in “emergency” situations as direct final rules without notice and comment.  
Because rulemaking is a cumbersome and complex process, FAA often uses guidelines—
advisory circulars, service bulletins, or other written procedures—that interpret and augment its 
regulations without going through a formal rulemaking process. FAA staff report that their major 
objective is to change behavior to promote aviation safety, and the agency would prefer to 
change guidance, operational manuals, and written procedures rather than initiate a rulemaking.  
Regulatory Development Process 
FAA is organized into program offices like the Aircraft Certification Service and the 
Flight Standards Service. In developing a rulemaking, these program offices receive assistance 
from the Offices of Rulemaking, Chief Counsel, and Aviation Policy and Plans. (See 
organization chart in Appendix.) The Office of Rulemaking has the primary responsibility for the 
management of the regulatory process. The Office of Chief Counsel provides legal advice and 
assistance in drafting regulations. The Office of Aviation Policy and Plans provides the 
economic analysis that must accompany significant rulemakings, given DOT’s requirements and 
the requirements of Executive Order 12866. Program offices provide technical expertise in 
drafting regulations. 
                                                 
113 Note that airworthiness directives and guidelines are prepared by the program offices and are not subject to this 
constraint on rule development. 
114 The directives are usually not incorporated in the CFR. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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FAA uses a rulemaking council to decide which rules to undertake and to establish 
priorities for rulemaking. The directors of the Office of Rulemaking and the Office of Aviation 
Policy and Plans and the assistant chief counsel for Regulation form the core rulemaking council. 
They plus the directors of program offices with rulemaking responsibility form the full council 
and meet every other month to discuss rulemaking initiatives. Program offices—like the Aircraft 
Certification Service and the Flight Standards Service—are the main sources for identifying 
issues that may deserve regulatory action. The burden falls on the program office to make its 
case for initiating a rulemaking. NTSB also represents an important source of new regulations. 
Congressional mandates tend to pick up NTSB and FAA program office initiatives. As a result, 
these mandates operate primarily to affect FAA priorities and timing by accelerating the 
rulemaking process, rather than adding items to FAA’s rulemaking agenda. 
Safety Metrics 
For its program assessment rating tool review, FAA has used a rolling three-year average 
of the accident rate per 100,000 departures as a safety metric
115 (Figure 13). These data suggest a 
roughly 70 to 80 percent reduction in fatal commercial aviation accidents over the 1990–2009 
period
116 (Table 12), close to the goal CAST set of reducing fatal commercial accidents by 80 
percent by 2007. Over this period, CAST helped identify a variety of safety problems that 
resulted in changes by FAA and the airlines, including an FAA airworthiness directive requiring 
inspection of engine components to address uncontained engine failure, a change by airlines in 
their automation policies and training to address inadequacies in pilot training, and the 
identification of airports that may require bird control.
117 FAA also took action in other areas to 
improve safety, including requiring the retrofit of commercial airplanes with fire detection and 
suppression systems, an airworthiness program to ensure continued safety of aircraft wiring 
systems over the life of the aircraft, and a program to reduce the risk of runway incursions.
118  
 
                                                 
115 In FY 2008, FAA shifted to fatalities per 100 million persons on board as a new safety metric. The rationale 
offered for this new metric is that it better measures individual passenger risk. Fatalities include all fatalities—
passengers, air crew, ground crew, and any others on the ground. U.S. DOT, Federal Aviation Administration, 
PART, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10002246.2004.html. 
116 The increase in 2001–2003 includes the onboard fatalities associated with the September 11, 2001, terrorism-
related crashes.  
117 GAO, Improved Data Quality and Analysis Capabilities Are Needed as FAA Plans a Risk-Based Approach to 
Safety Oversight (May 2010), GAO-10-414, 7. FAA reports that the work of CAST showed “great results. Since its 
creation ten years earlier, CAST analyzed data from approximately 500 accidents and thousands of safety incidents 
worldwide developing safety enhancements to reduce the leading cause of commercial aviation accidents in the 
United States.” FAA, Federal Aviation Administration: A Historical Perspective, 1903-2008, 147.  
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Transition in Safety Review 
The reduction in fatal accidents has been achieved through a “reactive” safety review 
process—that is, a review of accidents and incidents that have already happened to identify the 
underlying cause and appropriate corrective action by FAA and the air carriers. FAA is now 
moving to adopt a “proactive” approach that will identify precursors that could result in aviation 
safety risks. FAA views this shift as necessary because as accidents become rare, the data on 
accidents become increasingly sparse. The key to this new approach is the development of a 
much broader database of events through voluntary self-reporting to identify possible aviation 
safety risks. Because these reports can involve possible noncompliance with regulations, FAA 
provides incentives to encourage voluntary reports by resolving any noncompliance through 
corrective action rather than through punishment or discipline. FAA expects that the new 
approach will yield safety data that would otherwise be unobtainable.
119 Descriptions of the main 
FAA programs for the collection of voluntarily submitted information follow.  
Aviation Safety Action Program. The purpose of the program is to encourage air carrier 
and repair station employees to volunteer data that will help identify precursors to accidents. 
Because these reports can involve possible noncompliance with FAA regulations, the program 
provides an incentive: individuals who report safety issues will incur no more than an 
administrative action, provided certain conditions are met
120: (1) the employee must file a report 
in a timely manner; (2) the violation must be inadvertent; and (3) the event must not involve 
criminal activity, substance abuse, or intentional falsification.
121 
Flight Operational Quality Assurance. This program is designed to encourage the 
voluntary reporting of digital flight data generated during flight operations. These data provide 
objective information on flight operations that is not otherwise available. 
122 Under the program, 
the airline routinely downloads the data stored by digital flight recorders—these are the same 
data recorded for accident investigation purposes—for analysis. The airlines and pilots share the 
aggregated data, without identifiers, with FAA to help the agency identify trends that, if 
uncorrected, could cause accidents.
123 FAA will not use data submitted under the program in an 
enforcement action against the airline or its employees (except in the case of violations that are 
criminal or deliberate acts). 
                                                 
119 GAO, Improved Data Quality and Analysis Capabilities are needed as FAA Plans a Risk-Based Approach to 
Safety Oversight, GAO-10-414 (May 2010), 18.  
120 DOT, FAA, Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), Advisory Circular No. 120-66b, 1–5.  
121 Ibid., 7–8. 
122 FAA, Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA), ww.faa.gov/about/initiatives /atos/air_carrier/foqa/. 
123 Ibid. Also see FAA, Flight Operational Quality Assurance, Advisory Circular No. 120-82.  Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program. The purpose of this program is to encourage certificate 
holders (e.g., air carriers) and similar entities to identify and correct instances of noncompliance and to 
take steps and commit resources to prevent their recurrence. Certificate holders that satisfy the conditions 
of the program will receive a letter of correction instead of a civil penalty action. In this way, FAA hopes 
to obtain safety data that would otherwise be unobtainable.
124 The conditions are that (1) the certificate 
holder notifies FAA immediately upon detecting the apparent violation; (2) the violation is inadvertent; 
and (3) the event does not involve criminal activity, substance abuse, or intentional falsification.
125 
Aviation Safety Reporting Program. FAA also has in place a longstanding program for 
anonymous reporting of safety-related issues. Beginning in 1975, FAA instituted the voluntary Aviation 
Safety Reporting Program to encourage pilots, controllers, flight attendants, maintenance personnel, and 
other aviation workers to report actual or potential safety issues. To ensure anonymity for all parties 
involved, pilots, controllers, and the like submit these reports directly to the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration—an independent third party—and all processing, “de-identification,” and analysis 
are conducted by NASA. FAA uses this information to take corrective action to remedy safety issues and 
plan for improvements. FAA regulations prohibit the use of these reports in any disciplinary action, 
except in cases of a criminal offense or accident. Further, if a violation comes to its attention, FAA does 
not impose a civil penalty or revoke a certificate in response, provided the following conditions are 
met
126: 
  the violation was inadvertent and not deliberate; 
  the violation did not involve a criminal action or result in an accident; 
  the person was not involved in any prior FAA enforcement action in the previous five 
years; and 
  the person provides proof of a report of the violation to NASA within 10 days after the 
violation. 
Mandatory reporting programs. There are also mandatory reporting programs requiring 
reports on such events as accidents, engine failures, and near midair collisions. Overall, FAA has 
more than 10 reporting programs (Table 13). 
  
                                                 
124 DOT, FAA, Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program, Advisory Circular No. 00-58B, 3. 
125 Ibid., 4. 
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Users can search across multiple databases and display pertinent information in a variety of 
formats.
127  
Safety Management System 
FAA’s safety management approach also includes the adoption of a safety management 
system within the organizational structures in aviation (e.g., the airlines and air traffic control). A 
safety management system is essentially a quality management approach to controlling risk that 
provides managers with a detailed roadmap for monitoring safety-related processes.
128 It 
emphasizes safety management as a fundamental business process to be incorporated within the 
organization and provides the organizational framework to support a sound safety culture.
129  
Over the past five years, FAA has encouraged the voluntary development of SMS by 
aviation service providers and has taken several initial steps for rulemaking in this area. A joint 
industry-FAA committee to develop recommendations for SMS was established in February 
2009, and FAA issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on July 23, 2009. As noted 
above, the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act (August 2010) 
instructs FAA to conduct a rulemaking that would require commercial air carriers to implement 
safety management systems. The act requires that FAA consider including each of the following 
as elements of an SMS: the Aviation Safety Action Program, the Flight Operational Quality 
Assurance Program, a line operations safety audit, and an advanced qualification program.
130 On 
November 5, 2010, the FAA published an NPRM regarding SMS.
131 
The full benefits of the SMS program may be years in the future. The program will 
require not only access to existing databases (and the development and/or enhancement of 
databases for information that has previously not been obtainable) but also technical 
advancements in methods to identify precursors so that FAA can conduct risk-based analysis.
132 
In a recent report on the risk-based approach, GAO reported, 
133 
                                                 
127 www.asias.faa.gov/portal/page/portal/ASIAS_PAGES/ASIAS_HOME. 
128 FAA, Introduction to Safety Management Systems for Air Operators, Advisory Circular No. 120-92 (June 22, 
2006), 2. 
129 Ibid., 2. See also FAA, Safety Management System: SMS Explained, 
www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sms/explained/.  
130 Act, Section 215. 
131 75 FR 68224. 
132 GAO, Improved Data Quality and Analysis Capabilities Are Needed as FAA Plans a Risk-Based Approach to 
Safety Oversight (May 2010), 12. 
133 Ibid., 12. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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While FAA has issued agencywide guidance on implementing SMS and 
has some efforts such as ASIAS under way, it does not have a way to measure or 
specific times to indicate full implementation. FAA officials told us that the 
current efforts would provide a foundation for the full implementation of SMS. 
But without a clear description of the activities to be completed and time frames 
for their completion, it may be years before SMS is fully implemented and its 
benefits are realized. In commenting on a draft of this report, FAA officials noted 
that even with a clear description of the activities to be completed and time frames 
for their completion, it will be years before SMS is fully implemented and its 
benefits are realized. We agree with FAA and note that specific time frames 
establish expectations for FAA’s implementation of SMS and provide a means of 
accountability for meeting those expectations.  
Triggers for Regulatory Action 
FAA has adopted a structural approach to ensuring safety. FAA’s System Safety 
Handbook sets out a matrix of severity and likelihood of an incident as a basis for establishing 
priorities for agency response.
134 Table 14 presents categories of incident severity; Table 15 
presents the definitions for likelihood of occurrence. Table 15 has both qualitative and 
quantitative definitions because current FAA risk assessments may be either qualitative 
(reflecting subjective judgments by the analyst) or quantitative. Thus, a “probable” event is 
anticipated to occur one or more times during the operational life of a component or, 
quantitatively, has a probability per operational hour that is greater than 1 in 100,000. If the 
likelihood of occurrence is “probable,” any event in the major, hazardous, or catastrophic 
severity class would require tracking in the FAA hazard tracking system until the risk is reduced 
to an acceptable level. “Extremely improbable” events—that is, events that are not anticipated to 
occur during the entire operational life of an entire system or fleet or, quantitatively, a 
probability of occurrence less than 1 in 1 billion—do not require regulatory attention.
135 
The quantitative approach is necessary for a system-level fault tree analysis, required as a 
part of the aircraft certification process.
136 FAA is continuing to develop a quantitative 
assessment process for its evaluation of other operational safety requirements, such as 
airworthiness directives. 
                                                 
134 FAA, Safety System Handbook. www.faa.gov/library/manuals/aviation/risk_management/ss_handbook/ (last 
updated May 21, 2008). 
135 FAA, Certification Maintenance Requirements, Advisory Circular No.: 25-19. 
www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/advisory_Circular/AC%2025-19.pdf  
136 14 CFR 25.1309 (Part 25). Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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Table 14. Definitions of Severity in FAA’s Acquisition Management System Process 
 
Source: Federal Aviation Administration, FAA System Safety Handbook, Chapter 3: Principles of System Safety 
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Table 15. Definitions of Likelihood of Occurrence 
 
Source: Federal Aviation Administration, FAA System Safety Handbook, Chapter 3: Principles of System Safety 
(December 30, 2000): 3–6. 
Best Practices  
Once FAA has identified an area of concern and begins its investigation for rulemaking, 
it may use joint industry-FAA committees to develop recommendations on the appropriate 
regulatory response. These committees are the  Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 
Committee(ARAC) and the Aviation Rulemaking Committees(ARCs) which provide 
recommendations on regulatory issues as tasked by the FAA.. The ARAC is a standing 
committee chartered under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). The ARCs are 
chartered by the FAA administrator under special authority to address specific regulatory 
issues
137 and are not subject to FACA. They provide a forum that allows FAA to work with a 
broad range of interested parties in the aviation industry (aircraft manufacturers, airlines, pilots, 
etc.) and with international aviation groups to identify approaches to safety issues. If a 
rulemaking committee is addressing a general topic, consumer groups may also be included; 
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however, if it is addressing technical subject matter, it probably would not include consumer 
groups. None of the committees provide a venue for regulatory negotiation; FAA is not bound by 
the recommendations of either the advisory or the rulemaking committees. Often, no consensus 
emerges from the rulemaking process; instead, the committees identify a range of practices and 
options for consideration by FAA in rulemaking.  
Role of Costs 
FAA seeks to balance the likelihood and severity of a possible incident with the cost of 
implementing corrective action. Thus, where it can reasonably quantify the consequences of 
safety hazards, FAA uses benefit-cost and cost-effectiveness analysis to inform its regulatory 
decisions. FAA staff also report that where the costs are disproportionate relative to the benefits 
(including the benefits of reduced mortality and injury), FAA reviews the various requirements 
in the draft rule and may adjust rule requirements to achieve a better balance. As noted above, 
significant rules are subject to OMB review under Executive Order 12866, and FAA must 
complete a regulatory analysis assessing the benefits and costs for these rules. 
In January 1993, the Department of Transportation adopted a guidance memorandum, 
“Treatment of Value of Life and Injuries in Preparing Economic Evaluations,” which set forth 
recommended economic values to be used in departmental regulatory analysis
138. In the most 
recent update of that memorandum, dated March 18, 2009, DOT increased the value of a 
statistical life (VSL) to $6.0 million.
139 FAA recently published an NPRM that used a $6.0 
million VSL and an $8.4 million VSL.
140  In the Regulatory Impact Analysis for the NPRM, the 
FAA stated that a VSL value of $8.4 million is consistent with recent literature and requested 
public comment on whether decision-makers should consider using a VSL higher or lower than 
$6 million to evaluate commercial aviation safety proposals.
141  
Voluntary Consensus Standards 
FAA uses voluntary consensus standards to establish minimum operational performance 
standards for equipment or specifications for procurement. However, agency staff report that 
FAA does not use voluntary consensus standards for its aviation safety standards. To confirm 
                                                 
138 See: http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/Data/VSL93guid.pdf 
139 The $6 million value was raised from a value of $5.8 million adopted in 2007; the increase was based on changes 
to the wages and salaries component of the Employment Cost Index and the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). 
http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/reports/VSL%20Guidance%20031809%20a.pdf  
140 Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements proposed rule (75 FR 55852; September 14, 2010).  
141 www.regulations.gov, FAA-2009-1093. The notice also reports that the present value of the benefits would equal 
the present value of the costs at a value per averted fatality of $12.6 million.  Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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this, we reviewed FAAs major rules over the past 10 years and a sampling of its aviation safety 
regulations for 2008 and 2009. None of these rules used voluntary consensus standards. 
Role of Peer Review 
FAA staff report only limited use of peer review; however, FAA uses the Aviation 
Rulemaking Advisory Committee and its ARCs to provide outside input for rulemaking. As 
discussed above, the former is a standing committee chartered under FACA; the latter are 
chartered by the FAA administrator to address a specific regulatory issue. The membership of 
these committees brings a variety of interests to the table to discuss rulemaking issues—
including representatives of the pilots and air crews. 
FAA has an arrangement with the William J. Hughes Technical Center (comprising 
several university aeronautical engineering departments) for studies and consultation on specific 
areas of interest. This arrangement provides a national scientific technical base for FAA. 
Congress may mandate a National Academy of Sciences study for specific issues, but agency 
staff report that FAA itself does not typically request such reviews. 
Although FAA typically does not rely on peer review of its regulations, its regulations are 
under the continuing scrutiny of NTSB, which tracks and grades the FAA response (as well as 
the response of other entities) to its recommendations. A recent GAO report examined the 
response to NTSB recommendations (beginning with August 1996) addressing icing and 
weather-related operational conditions.142 GAO reports that of the 89 recommendation, 82 were 
directed to FAA. NTSB has closed 41 of the 82 recommendations as implemented (50 percent) 
and classified an additional 22 (27 percent) as cases where FAA has made acceptable progress. 
GAO reports that the combined 77 percent acceptance rate on NTSB recommendations is 
consistent with the rate for all NTSB recommendations. For this subset of 82, FAA responded 
within two years in an acceptable way (including acceptable but still unfinished and open 
actions) to 30 percent of NTSB recommendations and responded favorably to more than 50 
percent within three years (Table 16). FAA rejected—sometimes with a long lag—about 17 
percent of the recommendations (and still counting).  
                                                 
142 GAO issued a report on July 29, 2010, assessing the FAA response to NTSB recommendations related to winter 
weather and icing incidents in 1996– 2008; see GAO-10-679SP.  Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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Table 16. Adoption of Voluntary Standards by DOI, DOT, and EPA 
 































DOI 2007 0 0 4 300 186 63 30
DOI 2006 0 2 0 114 40 33 7
DOI 2005 0 2 768 74 ‐195 26 7
DOI 2004 0 0 788 269 ‐376 19 ‐6
DOI 2003 0 0 242 645 345 25 6
DOI 2002 2 0 616 300 231 19 14
DOI 2001 2 ‐‐ 69 ‐12 5 ‐24
DOI 2000 0 0 1569 81 ‐32 9‐25
DOI 1999 0 0 144 84 0 54 0
DOI 1998 0 0 144 84 ‐25 54 16
DOI 1997 0 0 205 109 ‐ 38 ‐
DOT 2007 3 0 4 198 ‐84 8 0
DOT 2006 3 0 12 206 ‐34 8 1
DOT 2005 3 0 381 209 42 47 6
DOT 2004 3 0 343 167 0 41 11
DOT 2003 3 0 323 167 ‐93 0‐24
DOT 2002 1 0 212 176 ‐15 4 ‐114
DOT 2001 0 8 246 177 ‐34 168 22
DOT 2000 0 11 153 211 ‐18 146 26
DOT 1999 0 28 238 229 ‐63 120 14
DOT 1998 1 7 197 292 0 106 ‐27
DOT 1997 2 ‐ 54 292 ‐ 133 ‐
EPA 2007 23 0 3 44 0 25 0
EPA 2006 50 0 38 44 ‐82 5 ‐1
EPA 2005 50 0 50 52 7 26 3
EPA 2004 50 0 67 45 1 23 2
EPA 2003 50 0 109 44 2 21 ‐1
EPA 2002 38 2 9 42 ‐42 2 2
EPA 2001 36 2 64 46 23 20 5
EPA 2000 2 0 229 23 ‐174 15 0
EPA 1999 83 0 34 197 ‐31 5 1
EPA 1998 3 0 157 200 0 14 3
EPA 1997 0 4 31 200 ‐ 11 ‐Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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Role of Peer Review 
FAA staff report only limited use of peer review; however, FAA uses the Aviation 
Rulemaking Advisory Committee and its ARCs to provide outside input for rulemaking. As discussed 
above, the former is a standing committee chartered under FACA; the latter are chartered by the FAA 
administrator to address a specific regulatory issue. The membership of these committees brings a 
variety of interests to the table to discuss rulemaking issues—including representatives of the pilots 
and air crews. 
FAA has an arrangement with the William J. Hughes Technical Center (comprising several 
university aeronautical engineering departments) for studies and consultation on specific areas of 
interest. This arrangement provides a national scientific technical base for FAA. Congress may 
mandate a National Academy of Sciences study for specific issues, but agency staff report that FAA 
itself does not typically request such reviews. 
Although FAA typically does not rely on peer review of its regulations, its regulations are 
under the continuing scrutiny of NTSB, which tracks and grades the FAA response (as well as the 
response of other entities) to its recommendations. A recent GAO report examined the response to 
NTSB recommendations (beginning with August 1996) addressing icing and weather-related 
operational conditions.
143 GAO reports that of the 89 recommendation, 82 were directed to FAA. 
NTSB has closed 41 of the 82 recommendations as implemented (50 percent) and classified an 
additional 22 (27 percent) as cases where FAA has made acceptable progress. GAO reports that the 
combined 77 percent acceptance rate on NTSB recommendations is consistent with the rate for all 
NTSB recommendations. For this subset of 82, FAA responded within two years in an acceptable 
way (including acceptable but still unfinished and open actions) to 30 percent of NTSB 
recommendations and responded favorably to more than 50 percent within three years (Table 16). 
FAA rejected—sometimes with a long lag—about 17 percent of the recommendations (and still 
counting).  
In addition, in response to requests from the U.S. Congress, especially the House Committee 
on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, GAO has continued to evaluate FAA’s actions in addressing safety concerns within 
the commercial aviation industry. As noted above, the GAO has completed more than 10 reports on 
FAA regulation of safety in the commercial aviation industry since 2005.  
                                                 
143 GAO issued a report on July 29, 2010, assessing the FAA response to NTSB recommendations related to winter 
weather and icing incidents in 1996– 2008; see GAO-10-679SP.  Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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Inspections, Enforcement, and Compliance 
Once FAA has identified a violation, its response can range from no action to administrative 
action to formal legal sanctions—that is, a monetary fine or the revocation of certification. FAA staff 
report that for key elements of the commercial aviation sector roughly 90 percent of identified 
violations are resolved without legal sanctions—either as no action or through administrative action 
(Tables 17 and 18). This is consistent with FAA’s initiative (discussed above) to encourage voluntary 
reporting of events and incidents. Where legal sanctions were imposed the final monetary penalty was 
often lower than the amount initially proposed (Table 19). 
Table 17. FAA Response Time, by Action Type  
 
Over the 2008–2009 period, FAA reported that it imposed monetary fines for roughly 600 
violations (for air carriers, commercial operations, and repair stations). The average fine was $34,000; 




T y p e 12345 6 ‐78 ‐9> 1 0
Closed ‐ Exceed Recommended Action 2 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
Closed ‐ Acceptable A c t i o n 1 1 8126‐ 32
Closed ‐ Acceptable Alternative Action ‐‐1 ‐ 11‐ 2
Open‐Acceptable Response ‐ 41 21 12 ‐ 3
Action Unacceptable ‐ Open ‐ 131‐‐‐2
Action Unacceptable ‐ Closed ‐ 13‐‐2 ‐ 2
Source: Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report GAO‐10‐679SP. Note: residual categories include
Open ‐ No Response, Closed ‐ Suspended, Closed ‐ Reconsidered, and Closed ‐ No Response.Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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2005  743  84%  144  16% 
2006  636  84%  123  16% 
2007  632  87%   96  13% 





2005  761  87%  109  13% 
2006  547  88%   78  12% 
2007  487  89%   58  11% 





2005  732  91%   73  9% 
2006  887  90%  100  10% 
2007  795  92%   70  8% 
2008  1023  93%   72  7% 
  
1. Warning notices or letters of correction. 
2. Legal actions involving the imposition of a monetary penalty or the temporary or permanent 
revocation of a certificate.  
Source: Peter Lynch, email message to the author, December 17, 2010. 
Table 19. Proposed and Final FAA Fines, by Category Type, 2005–2008 
 
 
Source: Peter Lynch, email message to the A. Fraas, October 29, 2010. 
Category Status Overall 2005 2006 2007 2008
121 Carrier Proposed $22,184,016 $5,091,249 $6,460,747 $5,871,520 $4,760,500
Final $13,905,466 $3,010,325 $3,967,833 $3,818,483 $3,108,825
135 Carrier Proposed $5,080,350 $1,445,550 $1,087,600 $1,219,900 $1,327,300
Final $1,976,707 $650,390 $425,233 $456,635 $444,449
Repair Station Proposed $3,943,603 $689,593 $1,152,650 $742,450 $1,358,910
Final $2,236,083 $387,345 $686,527 $358,175 $804,036Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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Revocation of certification is the most severe penalty at FAA’s disposal. Over the 2008–2009 
period FAA also suspended the certificate for 10 air carriers and commercial operators and for 7 
repair stations.
144  
FAA has established a formal enforcement decision tool for determining the appropriate 
response to a violation.
145 The level of response to a violation is based in part on an assessment of the 
risk associated with the violation. As defined in the enforcement decision tool, safety risk means the 
level (high, moderate, or low) of potential injury or property damage from a violation, considering the 
hazard severity and the likelihood of its occurring. Likelihood means the probability (frequent, 
occasional, or remote) of the worst type of injury or damage that could realistically occur in the 
specific case. 
The inspector identifying the violation makes the first judgment as to the appropriate 
response, and that judgment is reviewed by supervisors in the local FAA office. A decision to take no 
action or an administrative action (such as a warning notice) is not reviewed further within FAA. A 
recommendation for legal sanction by the local office is reviewed by the regional enforcement office 
and Chief Counsel’s Office. Major legal sanctions—large monetary fines or the revocation of 
certification—are reviewed by the  FAA headquarters Chief Counsel’s Office and the associate 
administrator for the program office with jurisdiction for the area in which the violation occurred.  
If the sanctioned party does not accept the legal penalty, its recourse depends on the nature 
and magnitude of the sanction. Large monetary fines—greater than $400,000 for large carriers and 
greater than $50,000 for small carriers—can be appealed in a U.S. district court. Smaller fines would 
be appealed to a DOT administrative law judge with appeal to the FAA administrator. The appeal of a 
revocation of a certificate goes to an NTSB administrative law judge with appeals to NTSB (with the 
commissioners serving as the review panel). Appeals of FAA administrator or NTSB decisions go to 
the U.S. appeals court for the principal place of residence or to the D.C. Circuit. 
Training Requirements and Practices 
Because human error continues to be the leading cause of accidents, improving human 
performance is central to enhancing safety. To reduce human error, the industry has adopted 
performance-based training in place of prescriptive training. FAA administrator has described 
performance-based training as follows:
146 
                                                 
144 FAA also revoked the certificates for 40 air carriers and commercial operators—probably all commercial operators—
and 16 approved repair stations. 
145 www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/2150.3B%20Ch%@)!%20only.pdf. 
146 www.faa.gov/news/testimony/news_story.cfm?newsId=10601. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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New technology, particularly simulators, allows high-fidelity training for 
events that we never could have trained to in the past using an aircraft, e.g., stall 
recovery. 
Thus, FAA can determine proficiency based on actual performance with training simulators, 
not just meeting course requirements or taking hours of training. Although the major airlines have 
already largely embraced this training approach, FAA recently issued a proposed rule upgrading the 
training requirements for the air crew.
147 This proposal was developed working with an aviation 
rulemaking committee that included pilots, flight attendants, and representatives of airlines and 
training centers.  
Personnel Management 
To provide greater flexibility in such important personnel matters as compensation and hiring, 
Congress has exempted FAA from certain federal personnel requirements.
148 FAA has responded by 
adopting a performance-based compensation program that provides a wider range of pay and greater 
management flexibility to hire and retain employees. FAA’s hiring flexibilities include on-the-spot 
hiring and monetary incentives for the recruitment and retention of personnel.
149 
As a part of FAA’s exercise of this flexibility, it conducts an annual comparability analysis to 
determine the competitiveness of its pay structure with the GS salary tables and the private market. 
The upper end of the highest FAA pay band for technical and engineering career levels appears to be 
roughly 5 percent greater than the upper end of the GS-15 level. In general, GS-15 levels in federal 
agencies have typically been reserved for management-level positions, rather than for technical staff. 
FAA believes that the increases it adopted at the beginning of 2010 bring its pay band structure into 
closer alignment with the GS salary tables and the external market.
150 
In the Aircraft Certification Service, engineers (e.g., aeronautical engineers) constitute 
roughly half of the staff of 400. The engineers typically come to FAA with 5 to 10 years of 
experience—often with an aircraft manufacturer. The aircraft certification office also uses inspectors, 
typically from skilled blue-collar crafts with experience in quality assurance and quality control in 
manufacturing. There are a small number of slots at the GS-15 level (or above) for specialists (e.g., an 
engineer with specialized experience in composite materials or in metal fatigue). 
                                                 
147 Federal Register, January 12, 2009 (74 FR 1280). 
148 GAO, CIA, Federal Courts, FBI, Treasury, FDIC, Federal Reserve, and SEC have also received exemptions from Title 
5 U.S.C. requirements and have adopted broad-banding and pay-for-performance approaches. 
149 GAO. 
150 FAA, Administrator’s Message, www.faa.gov/news/updates/index.cfm?newsId=60098&print=go  Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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The economists are in Aviation Policy and Planning. There are currently nine economists (not 
all of the 13 to 14 positions are filled). Roughly half have Ph.D.s; the rest have master’s degrees. 
Experience prior to FAA varies.  
Main Points about FAA 
FAA is responsible for administering the Federal Aviation Act to provide a safe, efficient 
aviation system. The Act allows the use of economics and benefit–cost analysis in making regulatory 
decisions. 
Because carriers, manufacturers, air crew, and the public all have a substantial interest in the 
safety of commercial aviation, there is a high degree of cooperation between the regulated industry 
and the FAA. Thus, the FAA makes extensive use of joint industry-FAA advisory committees (e.g., 
ARAC and the ARCs) in developing its safety regulations. FAA uses voluntary consensus standards 
to establish minimum operational performance standards for equipment or specifications for 
procurement; but it does not use such standards for aviation safety regulations. Finally, FAA 
regulation takes place in the context of a significant measure of oversight by NTSB and Congress. 
In the past, the FAA has relied on review by the NTSB, joint industry-FAA review, and 
internal FAA review of past accidents and incidents to identify potential problems for aviation safety. 
The FAA is now moving to a “proactive” approach that would evaluate a much broader array of 
events as a way of identifying potential safety issues. To implement this new approach, the FAA is 
promoting the development of an extensive database of aircraft activity and events. In addition, the 
FAA is developing new regulations requiring carriers to adopt safety management systems.   
4. Environmental Protection Agency 
Background  
Established in 1970, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency now administers all or part of 
32 statutes, including 10 major ones covering air, water, and land pollution and pesticide and 
chemical regulation.
151 Unlike MMS and FAA, EPA does not focus on a single industry. The 
regulatory authorities of EPA cut across virtually all domestic industries and some consumer 
practices as well. Most of these responsibilities cover the management of continuous emissions or 
releases of pollutants, although the agency is also involved in oil spill prevention and response, 
certain types of chemical and accidental releases, and cleanup activities on both land and water. Most 
programs are implemented by the states, with funding from and oversight by EPA. Lacking a single, 
                                                 
151 See Appendix A. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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overarching statute, the individual laws EPA implements are integrated by the agency’s broad 
mandate to protect human health and the environment. Naturally, in the absence of an organic statute, 
there are major differences among the agency’s programs. 
Compared with MMS and FAA, where lawsuits are relatively rare, EPA is regularly 
challenged in the courts. This may reflect the broad reach and relatively high cost of its regulations, 
estimated at about 2 percent of GDP. Whatever the cause of the litigious environment in which EPA 
operates, the threat of legal challenge has probably contributed to the agency’s emphasis on science 
and quantitative risk assessment. 
 EPA’s FY 2011 operating budget, which supports research, regulation, and enforcement, is 
$3.9 billion. EPA also administers state and tribal assistance grant programs ($4.8 billion) to support 
environmental management activities across the United States, and infrastructure financing for water 
treatment and related projects ($3.8 billion). The agency employs approximately 17,400 people across 
the country—at its headquarters office in Washington, D.C., in 10 regional offices, and at more than a 
dozen laboratories and field sites. The agency also funds substantial extramural grants and contracts 
in support of its mission. More than 3,000 staff members are involved in compliance and enforcement 
activities.  
In this section, we discuss EPA’s handling of the same issues facing MMS and FAA. Most of 
the data are drawn directly from EPA sources, although some academic studies and anecdotal sources 
are also used. 
Regulatory Development: Decisionmaking Criteria and Analysis 
Rulemaking 
EPA’s regulatory activities are dictated by specific decisionmaking criteria contained in the 
multiple statutes it administers. In some cases, the statutory criteria are quite specific. For example, 
although the most recent round of auto standards does require extensive technical and policy 
judgments by the agency, historically, most tailpipe regulations have had formalized numeric criteria 
established in statute. In other cases, however, the statutory criteria are relatively broad and, arguably, 
require extensive technical and policy judgments by the agency to set numeric standards. For 
example, the Clean Air Act (CAA) directs the EPA administrator to set primary ambient air quality 
standards that “… allowing an adequate margin of safety … protect the public health.”[Clean Air Act, 
Section 109 (b) (1)] Similarly, the Clean Water Act (CWA) states, “… it is the national goal that the 
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters … and … the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic 
amounts be eliminated.”[Clean Water Act, Section 101 9a)]  
The opportunity to use economic analyses under each of the major laws the agency 
administers varies considerably by statute. As shown in Table 20, several statutes allow or even 
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reduction from uncontrolled levels, and rate of emission per unit of output (such as CWA 
effluent limits); 
  controls on the sale and use of products that have environmental effects when used or 
disposed of (e.g., mobile source regulations under the CAA, controls on materials affecting 
stratospheric ozone, and pesticide regulation under FIFRA); 
  controls on contaminants in products directly consumed, such those regulated by the SDWA; 
  controls on operations of activities that manage or use hazardous materials, such as Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements for management, disposal, and 
transportation of hazardous waste; 
  targets for remediation of past releases, such as RCRA corrective action; 
  controls to prevent degradation of targeted areas or resources, such as prevention of 
significant deterioration requirements under the CAA or nondegradation requirements under 
the CWA; 
  requirements for public reporting of information, such as the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act and the SDWA; 
  protection of workers from exposure during employment, such as FIFRA worker protection 
standards; and 
  decision processes, procedures, and certification training requirements for private abatement 
of hazards, such as the TSCA lead abatement program. 
 
In support of that wide array of regulatory actions, EPA has developed extensive procedures 
and policies for data collection, risk assessment, economic analysis, research, and peer review. For 
example, the agency has extensive guidelines for technical analyses covering risk and economic 
issues.153 To determine best practices, EPA often conducts surveys of pollution control technologies 
used in different industries.  
                                                 
153 For a list of the agency’s guidelines, see 
http://nlquery.epa.gov/epasearch/epasearch?querytext=epa+guidelines+&fld=&areaname=&typeofsearch=epa&areaconta
cts=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.epa.gov%2Fepahome%2Fcomments.htm&areasearchurl=&result_template=epafiles_default.
xsl&filter=sample4filt.hts Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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Although EPA has its share of critics regarding the quality of its science, many observers see 
it as a leader among federal regulatory agencies in its emphasis on science and quantitative analysis. 
In fact, more than $800 million, roughly 20 percent of the agency’s FY 2011 total operating budget, 
is categorized as science and technology (EPA 2009). A large portion of this funding is used to 
support the agency’s regulatory agenda. In addition, substantial portions of its $2.9 billion program 
and management budget are devoted to quantitative risk assessments, as well as to technology and 
economic assessments, including regulatory impact analyses (RIAs). 
EPA measures its overall performance in terms of five long-term goals: 
  clean air and global climate change; 
  clean and safe water; 
  land preservation and restoration; 
  healthy communities and ecosystems; and 
  compliance and environmental stewardship. 
The agency has established a total of 20 measurable objectives in support of those goals, each of 
which is based on a dozen or more specific metrics. Progress on all the agency metrics has been 
substantial in recent years. In most cases, progress extends over several decades. For example, under 
the clean air and global climate change goal, in the “healthier outdoor air” objective, EPA reports 
major reductions in unhealthy levels of exposure to fine and ultrafine particulate matter (both PM10 
and PM2.5), lead, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and ozone. Similarly, emissions of sulfur dioxide 
and both stationary and mobile sources of toxics have also declined.  
Other clean air and global climate change categories are protection of the ozone layer, 
radiation, greenhouse gas intensity, and the enhancement of science and research, all of which also 
demonstrate substantial progress over the years. The agency also reports gains in its other long-term 
goals. A further area in which EPA reports progress is the recently established category of homeland 
security and emergency response. For details, see EPA’s “Performance and Accountability Report 
FY2009.”154 
A total of 53 evaluations of EPA programs using the program assessment rating tool were 
conducted by OMB over 2003–2006.155 Ninety percent of EPA programs were rated as performing, 
and the remaining 10 percent were judged as nonperforming. These scores are somewhat above 
OMB’s government-wide average level of 80 percent performing and 20 percent nonperforming. 
                                                 
154 http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/par/ 
155 See ExpectMore website, http://financingstimulus.org/index.html.  Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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Among those in the performing category, two-thirds were deemed adequate and the other one-third 
were considered moderately effective, a higher rating. None of the agency’s programs were rated 
effective, OMB’s highest category.  
EPA has a relatively strong track record in quantifying the benefits and costs of its actions. 
Despite statutory provisions limiting or even precluding the use of economic analyses in 
decisionmaking, the agency conducts extensive economic studies on pending regulations. In a recent 
report to Congress, OMB presents estimates of the total annual benefits and costs of major federal 
rules, by agency. For the 10-year period ending September 30, 2009, OMB reports that EPA issued 
30 major rules, with total benefits of $81.9 billion to $533.1 billion. The cost of these rules is 
estimated to range from $25.9 billion to $29.2 billion. In several cases, the rules were issued on the 
basis of particular statutory provisions even though the estimated cost exceeded the quantified 
benefits. Interestingly, compared with the 95 major rules issued by all federal agencies over the same 
10-year period, the 30 EPA regulations were responsible for 82.6 percent of the total benefits and 
56.3 percent of the total costs.156 
Voluntary Consensus Standards 
Unlike MMS, EPA does not rely heavily on voluntary consensus standards. Based on a recent 
report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in compliance with OMB 
Circular A-119, covering FY 2007, EPA adopted 3 of the 350 voluntary consensus standards used 
that year throughout the government, or less than 1 percent. Similarly, only 1.3 percent of the 3,370 
employees participating in voluntary consensus standards bodies on a government-wide basis were 
from EPA. The same report indicates that EPA regulations constituted almost half of the cases where 
government unique standards were used in lieu of voluntary consensus standards. 157 
EPA offered the following rationales for developing its own standards: the voluntary 
consensus standard was “too broad to be useful in a regulatory sense,” lacked “quality control and 
quality assurance requirements,” was “too general, too broad, or not sufficiently detailed to assure 
compliance with EPA regulatory requirements,” had “applicability specifications [that were] not 
clearly defined,” could “detect leaks but not classify the leak as [a volatile organic compound],” and 
was “not a complete weighting procedure because it does not include a pretest procedure.”158 Clearly, 
                                                 
156 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Reugaltions and 
Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (Washington, DC: Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs), 
2010. 
157 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Eleventh Annual Report on Federal Agency Use of Voluntary 
Consensus Standards and Conformity Assessment, NISTIR 7503 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 
May), 2008. 
158 Ibid. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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the agency does not readily accept standards established by industry but rather, in almost all cases, 
uses its expertise and the authority granted to it by Congress to establish its own standards.159 
International Practices: Information Exchanges 
EPA is involved in information exchanges with many foreign governments and international 
organizations on matters of science, technology, and policy. For example, the agency participates in 
numerous groups and committees of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
EPA has also established bilateral agreements with foreign governments, especially developing 
countries. These agreements involve information exchanges on a range of issues, including air and 
water pollution, waste management, chemical regulation, and climate change. For example, in FY 
2008, the agency developed a program with China to establish human health and environmental 
training and programs on exported and imported products.  
The agency also participates in international enforcement activities. For example, EPA works 
with state, federal, and international governments to secure compliance along the U.S. borders with 
Canada and Mexico to ensure that imported goods and hazardous waste shipments comply with U.S. 
environmental laws. Further, EPA shares information and techniques for compliance assurance with 
other countries and provides technical assistance and training to increase enforcement and 
compliance capacity. For example, in FY 2008, EPA helped establish the International Network of 
Environmental and Compliance Training Professionals to support international sharing of information 
and techniques for training environmental professionals, including inspectors.  
Metrics and Measurements of Performance 
EPA uses a range of metrics to assess risks to human health and the environment. The agency 
has issued scientific documents outlining principles and concepts that guide risk assessment for 
carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, developmental toxicity, exposure, chemical mixtures, and other 
hazards. In the area of cancer risks, the agency has established a lifetime risk range of 1 in 10,000 to 1 
in 1,000,000 as generally acceptable for regulatory decisions and for site cleanup. For noncancer 
health risks, the agency has developed extensive guidance on the use of reference doses for different 
                                                 
159 One might argue that because EPA tends to deal with nonmarket externalities, private parties don’t have much 
incentive to develop voluntary standards until the government determines how much health or environmental damage 
constitutes a violation. FAA and, to some extent, MMS deal with problems for which markets generally exist, and for 
which private parties can seek recovery. Thus, at least some of the externalities are internalized without the government’s 
having to referee. Of course, because some oil spill damages also involve nonmarket externalities, these distinctions are 
not clearcut.  Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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toxicants. EPA’s integrated risk information system represents a compendium of chemical toxicity 
values that incorporate the agency’s latest research and approved methodologies.160 
Beyond the consideration of individual pollutants and individual environmental problems, 
EPA has also considered the relative risks posed by the different problem areas it manages. In a 1987 
study entitled “Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems,” the 
agency compared the relative risks posed by 31 problems within four broad risk categories—human 
cancer risk, human noncancer risk, ecological risk, and welfare risk—focusing on the risks that 
remain after currently required controls have been applied, i.e., residual risks. Among other findings, 
the report noted the disparity between residual risks and EPA’s resource allocations to individual 
programs.  
In its regulatory impact analyses, the agency uses $6 million as the value of a statistical life. 
However, this metric is not rigidly adhered to in decisionmaking. Largely because the statutes are not 
uniformly governed by economic criteria, in numerous instances the cost per life saved has exceeded 
$6 million, sometimes by a large margin, as has been documented in the academic literature.161 
The agency typically devotes considerable resources to quantifying and monetizing the 
environmental, health, and safety risks and benefits of taking action. EPA’s Office of Air and 
Radiation is an agency leader in this area. For example, recent RIAs involving sulfur dioxide, 
nitrogen oxides, and mercury have quantified the following endpoints: premature mortality long-term 
exposure for adults (>30 years) and children (<1 year) PM, chronic bronchitis (adults, 26 and older), 
nonfatal myocardial infarctions PM, hospital admissions from respiratory causes O3 and PM, hospital 
admissions from cardiovascular causes PM, emergency room visits for asthma O3 and PM, acute 
bronchitis (children, aged 8–12) PM, lower respiratory symptoms (children, aged 7–14) PM, upper 
respiratory symptoms (asthmatic children, aged 9–11) PM, asthma exacerbations PM, work loss days 
(adults aged 18–65) PM, minor restricted-activity days (adults, aged 18–65) O3 and PM, school 
absence days (children aged 6–11) O3, worker productivity (outdoor workers aged 18–65) O3, 
recreational visibility (81 Class I areas), mercury poisoning episodes, neurologic effects, 
cardiovascular impacts, genotoxic effects, immunotoxic effects, other human toxicity data, and 
ecological effects.162 
                                                 
160 http://www.epa.gov/IRIS/ 
161 See, for example, Tengs, T.O., M.E. Adams, J.S. Pliskin, D.G. Safran, J.E. Siegel, M.C. Weinstein, and J.D. Graham. 
1995. Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-Effectiveness,  Risk Analysis 15(3): 369–90, . 
162 For more information, see http://www.epa.gov/cair/pdfs/finaltech08.pdf and 
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Resources Available for Regulatory Analysis 
As noted, more than half of EPA employees are engineers, scientists, and policy analysts. 
Table 21 shows the distribution of EPA employees with graduate degrees (in 27 academic 
disciplines) as recorded in the EPA personnel records as of November 1996 (the most recent 
available). The disciplines, in descending order, are law (18 percent), biological or life sciences (16 
percent), engineering (16 percent), physical science (14 percent), business management and 
administrative services (7 percent), public administration, including public policy (7 percent), social 
science other than economics (5 percent), health sciences (3 percent), conservation and natural 
resources (3 percent), and economics (2 percent). Although comparable data for other agencies are 
not publicly available, most observers agree that EPA has one of the most highly educated 
workforces among federal regulatory agencies. 
Despite the high degree of training of its employees, an issue of possible concern is the extent 
to which EPA attracts and retains the “best and brightest.” The evidence on this issue is not very 
strong, but the agency does have a good track record of attracting graduates of prestigious schools. 
Further, EPA has pioneered in the efforts to expand eligibility for high grade levels to highly skilled 
employees outside management. 
With its highly educated workforce, large network of consultants and university experts, and 
substantial extramural budget to support research and analysis, EPA is able to conduct extensive 
research and analysis in support of its agenda. For example, the agency reported spending $150 
million in FY 2009 on science and research in support of its clean air and global climate change goal, 
including on the issues of air toxics, global protection, the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 
and others. Comparable activities are underway to enhance science and research in support of the 
agency’s other long-term goals. 
In the area of economic analysis, the agency has issued detailed guidelines and routinely 
develops 8 to 10 RIAs per year at an estimated cost of $1 million (1997$) each.163 EPA also conducts 
economic and regulatory analyses for dozens of rules that do not meet the threshold requirements for 
a formal RIA.  
 
  
                                                 
163 Morgenstern, R. Economic Analyses at EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact (Washington, DC: Resources for the 
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Table 21. Graduate Degrees of EPA Employees 
 
Source:  Morgenstern, R., Table 2 in “Legal and Institutional Settings,” Economic Analyses at EPA: Assessing 









Law 50 1,201 1,251 18.1
Biological science/life science 500 624 1,124 16.2
Engineering 104 992 1,096 15.8
Physical science 323 613 936 13.5
Business management and administrative 
services 6 463 469 6.8
Public administration 9 442 451 6.5
Social sciences and history/not including 
economics 52 294 346 5.0
Health professional and related sciences 31 157 188 2.7
Conservation/renewable natural resources 23 154 177 2.6
Economics 31 85 116 1.7
Agriculture 34 76 110 1.6
Architecture 2 101 103 1.5
Education 5 91 96 1.4
Multi/interdisciplinary studies 11 76 87 1.3
Psychology 25 28 53 0.8
Computer/information science 4 45 49 0.7
English language and literature 5 40 45 0.7
Communications 2 34 36 0.5
Library science 0 30 30 0.4
Philosophy and religion 21 9 30 0.4
Liberal arts and sciences, general studies and 
humanities 0 23 23 0.3
Foreign language/literature 2 11 13 0.2
Visual and performing arts 0 10 10 0.1
Home economics 5 4 90 . 1
Ethnic/cultural studies 1 7 8 0.1
Theological studies/religious vocations 2 6 8 0.1
Other 25 86 111 1.6
Total** 1,248 5,674 6,922 100*
* As percent of total employees at EPA with graduate degrees
** Totals may not add due to double‐counting of employees with more than one graduate degree.Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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Role of Peer Review 
Although a common refrain from agency defenders is that the science drives regulatory 
decisions, critics make routine claims of poor quality studies and/or overinterpretation of the results. 
Over the years, agency analyses and regulatory decisions have been reviewed by numerous panels of 
the National Academy of Sciences and others, which sometimes fault the agency and other times hail 
it as a leader in the field. A 2001 report noted that the “risk assessment process is bogged down … 
decision-making based on risk assessment is also bogged down … uncertainty, an inherent property 
of scientific data, continues to lead to multiple interpretations and contribute to decisionmaking 
gridlock.”164 The report recommended improvements in agency practices in several areas: 
  design of risk assessment; 
  uncertainty and variability; 
  selection and use of defaults; 
  development of a unified approach to dose-response assessment; 
  cumulative risk assessment; and 
  mechanisms for improving the utility of risk assessment. 
 
In response to that and other reviews, and following issuance of 2004 OMB guidance on 
information quality, in 2006 EPA established a formal policy for conducting peer review of 
scientifically and technically based agency outputs, including economic and social science products, 
that are intended to inform agency decisions. EPA deems peer review to occur when the designated 
work products are evaluated by relevant experts who were not involved in creating the product itself.  
On January 31, 2006, the EPA administrator issued the agency’s most recent policy statement 
on peer review: 
Peer review of all scientific and technical information that is intended to 
inform or support Agency decisions is encouraged and expected. Influential scientific 
information, including highly influential scientific assessments, should be peer 
reviewed in accordance with the Agency’s Peer Review Handbook. All Agency 
managers are accountable for ensuring that Agency policy and guidance are 
                                                 
164 National Research Council, Science and Decisions: Advancing Risk Assessment. Committee on Improving Risk 
Analysis Approaches Used by the U.S. E.P.A., Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology (Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press), 2001: 3-4. 
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appropriately applied in determining if their work products are influential or highly 
influential, and for deciding the nature, scope, and timing of their peer review. For 
highly influential scientific assessments, external peer review is the expected 
procedure. For influential scientific information intended to support important 
decisions, or for work products that have special importance in their own right, 
external peer review is the approach of choice. Peer review is not restricted to the 
nearly final version of work products; in fact, peer review at the planning stage can 
often be extremely beneficial.165  
EPA’s Science Policy Council is responsible for overseeing agency-wide implementation of 
the peer review policy, including promoting consistent interpretation, assessing agency-wide 
progress, developing recommendations for revisions of the policy, and issuing the Peer Review 
Handbook, which provides additional information and procedures on implementation.166  
EPA also relies on committees established under the authority of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act of 1972 to obtain advice on a wide range of environmental issues. FACA committees 
can be created by the President, Congress, or federal departments or agencies but must meet these 
basic requirements:  
  Meeting must be open to the public, and the public must be permitted to present their views. 
  All meeting minutes and reports must be available for public access. 
  The public must be notified of meetings by advertisement in the Federal Register. 
  Committee membership must be balanced by points of view. 
EPA’s Office of Federal Advisory Committee Management and Outreach operates the 
agency’s FACA committees and has responsibility for the oversight and policy of all EPA federal 
advisory committees. Currently, EPA operates four FACA committees: 
  Advisory Council on Clean Air Compliance Analysis. This committee provides advice on 
technical and economic aspects of reports EPA prepares on the effects of the Clean Air Act.  
  Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee. The committee advises EPA on the technical bases 
for the agency’s national ambient air quality standards program.  
                                                 
165 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Peer Review Advisory Group, Peer Review Handbook, 3rd edition, 
prepared for EPA’s Science Policy Council (Washington, DC: U.S. EPA), 2006. 
http://www.epa.gov/peerreview/pdfs/peer_review_handbook_2006.pdf. 
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  National Advisory Council for Environmental Policy and Technology. This committee 
advises the EPA administrator on a broad range of environmental policy, technology, and 
management issues. 
  Science Advisory Board. The board provides peer review and other types of expert advice on 
a wide range of topics in science and technology.  
In addition, there is a Science Advisory Panel, established by Congress in 1975 through 
FIFRA. The panel is composed of seven members representing a breadth of scientific disciplines and 
focuses on the risks that pesticides pose to wildlife, farm workers, pesticide applicators, and the 
general public through diet and exposure in homes, schools, parks, pools, and golf courses. Like the 
Science Advisory Board, it operates in accordance with FACA. Its scientists neither make nor 
recommend policy but provide advice on the science used in policymaking.  
The FACA committees include scientists, public health officials, businesses, citizens, 
community representatives, and members from all levels of government—approximately 800 
individuals altogether. On its website, the agency touts its “open, transparent, and peer reviewed 
research planning, competitively awarded extramural research grants; independent peer review of 
EPA science publications, assessments, and documents; and rigorous peer review of EPA’s research 
laboratories and centers.”167 
Inspections, Compliance, and Enforcement 
Training Requirements and Practices 
EPA has developed training programs to maintain and upgrade the skills and knowledge of its 
staff throughout the agency. For example, in the area of enforcement, the agency’s in-house National 
Enforcement Training Institute (NETI) serves as a clearinghouse for training information within the 
enforcement and compliance assurance program, exploring cost-effective means of delivering both 
classroom and distance training. NETI supports training of federal, state, local, and tribal attorneys, as 
well as inspectors, civil and criminal investigators, and technical experts, in all the tools for 
environmental compliance and enforcement. NETI conducts a range of activities:  
  identifying strategic education and training needs that reflect priorities and gaps in knowledge 
and skills of those engaged in ensuring compliance with federal environmental laws;  
                                                 
167 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Role of Science at EPA. 2010. http://www.epa.gov/epahome/science.htm, 
Accessed October 5, 2010. 
 Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
97 
  providing education and training through quality courses and materials, offered through a 
variety of delivery mechanisms, to build and maintain competency and professionalism; 
  providing training in compliance monitoring, compliance assistance, compliance incentives, 
and civil and criminal enforcement; and 
  promoting a culture of continuous learning among environmental compliance professionals in 
federal, state, tribal and local governments.  
Further information is available on the EPA website.168  
Regulatory Enforcement  
Enforcement of the environmental statutes it administers is a high priority for EPA. As noted, 
more than 3,000 people, roughly 20 percent of its workforce, are engaged in enforcement activities. 
An important part of the agency’s effort is aimed at the oversight of state government agencies and 
others delegated to carry out frontline enforcement efforts. The overall goal of the enforcement 
program is to maximize compliance with the federal environmental statutes through compliance 
assistance, monitoring, and enforcement. The agency implements a total of 28 separate program areas 
dealing with prevention and control of air pollution, water pollution, hazardous waste, toxic 
substances, and pesticides. The statutory and regulatory requirements of these programs apply to a 
diverse universe of regulated entities and include the use of incentive policies, which reduce or waive 
penalties under certain conditions for facilities that voluntarily discover, promptly disclose, and 
correct environmental problems. 
Monitoring of state and regional activities is done at varying frequencies, depending on the 
nature of the project. At a minimum, an evaluation is done at midyear and at the end of a fiscal year 
based on regional and state results entered in agency databases and data for national priorities. The 
performance expectations and activities outlined in the agency’s guidance documents are the starting 
point from which headquarters and the regional offices discuss the management of program activities 
and the distribution of resources. These discussions result in regional commitments for a specific 
level of activity for the fiscal year. The commitments constitute the agreed-upon approach between 
the regions and the national program managers for achieving performance expectations in the core 
program and national priority focus areas for the fiscal year.  
EPA sets national enforcement initiatives every three years to focus resources toward the most 
significant environmental problems and human health challenges identified by EPA staff, states, 
tribes, and the public. Many of the annual commitments in the agency’s guidance documents, as well 
                                                 
168 http://www.epa.gov/compliance/training/neti/. Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
98 
as the activities associated with the core enforcement and compliance assurance program, support the 
priorities for EPA regions. For example, in FY 2009, annual commitments for inspections and 
assistance to concentrated animal feeding operations support Northeast and Great American West 
regional agriculture priorities. The air toxics national priority and accompanying commitment 
supports the regional Great South, Midwest, and U.S.-Mexico border priorities for air toxics. Core 
program implementation and results for TSCA lead enforcement support the Midwest regional 
priority for lead poisoning. The national priority for RCRA mineral processing supports the Great 
American West regional priority for mining. Implementation of national priorities and associated 
annual commitments on stormwater, combined sewer overflows, and sanitary sewer overflows 
support U.S.-Mexico Border, Islands, Northeast, Great South, and Midwest regional priorities for 
wastewater, drinking water quality, nutrients, and sedimentation.  
Although private firms can audit themselves more cheaply and effectively than regulators can, 
firms may be deterred by fear that information they uncover will be used against them. To reduce this 
disincentive, the EPA audit policy, formally titled “Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, 
Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations,” provides incentives for regulated entities to 
voluntarily come into compliance with federal environmental laws and regulations. The policy was 
introduced in 1995 and revised in 2004. The regulated entity must voluntarily discover, promptly 
disclose to EPA, expeditiously correct, and prevent recurrence of the environmental violation. 
Disclosures are often preceded by consultation between EPA and the regulated entity, during which 
mutually acceptable disclosure details, compliance, and audit schedules are discussed. 
Civil penalties under the environmental laws generally have two components, an amount 
assessed based upon the severity, or “gravity,” of the violation, and the amount of economic benefit a 
violator received from failing to comply with the law. The policy includes the following two 
provisions: 
  No gravity-based penalties are assessed if all nine of the policy’s conditions are met. EPA 
retains its discretion to collect any economic benefit that may have been realized as a result of 
noncompliance. 
  Gravity-based penalties are reduced by 75 percent if the disclosing entity meets all of the 
policy’s conditions except detection of the violation through a systematic discovery process. 
Further, entities that disclose criminal violations are not recommended for prosecution if all of 
the applicable conditions are met. “Systematic discovery” is not a requirement for eligibility for this 
provision, although the entity must act in good faith and adopt a systematic approach to preventing 
future violations. 
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  The violation was detected in “systematic discovery”—that is, through an environmental audit 
or the implementation of a compliance management system. Discovery occurs when any 
officer, director, employee, or agent of the facility has an objectively reasonable basis for 
believing that a violation has or may have occurred. 
  The violation was not detected as a result of a legally required monitoring, sampling, or 
auditing procedure. 
  The violation is promptly disclosed in writing to EPA—within 21 days of discovery or such 
shorter time as may be required by law.  
  Independent discovery and disclosure take place before EPA or another regulator would likely 
have identified the violation through its own investigation or based on information provided 
by a third party. 
  Correction and remediation occur within 60 calendar days—in most cases, from the date of 
discovery. 
  The facility prevents recurrence of the violation. 
  Repeat violations—that is, the specific (or closely related) violations at the same facility 
within the past three years or those that have occurred as part of a pattern at multiple facilities 
owned or operated by the same entity within the past five years—are ineligible. If the facility 
has been newly acquired, the existence of a violation prior to acquisition does not trigger the 
repeat violations exclusion. 
  Certain types of violations are ineligible, such as those that result in serious actual harm, those 
that may have presented an imminent and substantial endangerment, and those that violate the 
specific terms of an administrative or judicial order or consent agreement. 
  Cooperation by the disclosing entity is required.169 
Even if the entity fails to meet the first condition, systematic discovery, it may still be eligible 
for 75 percent penalty mitigation and a recommendation for no criminal prosecution. 
Although the audit policy is widely touted by the agency and by some in the enforcement 
community, there are few independent analyses. One recent study170 compared the self-reported 
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violations with those detected by standard EPA enforcement and found that the typical self-audited 
violation was relatively minor. Cases arising under the policy were more likely to concern reporting 
violations and less likely to concern emissions. 
Table 22 displays detailed information on the accomplishments of EPA’s enforcement 
activities for FY 2007 and FY 2008. The agency conducted 20,000 inspections and evaluations of 
facilities in FY 2008, slightly fewer than in the prior year. Apart from its Superfund-related 
enforcement activities, in FY 2008 the agency concluded civil and criminal enforcement actions 
requiring polluters to spend an estimated $11.7 billion on pollution controls, cleanup, and 
environmental projects plus an additional $39 million on environmentally beneficial projects, up 
slightly from the prior year. In addition to these pollution reductions, the agency assessed more than 
$125 million in civil penalties, and courts sentenced defendants to pay more than $60 million in 
criminal fines and an additional $12 million in court-ordered environmental projects, up substantially 
from the prior year.  
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EPA involves the public in its enforcement efforts. For example, EPA has a website where 
individuals can report potential environmental violations in their communities and workplaces. On its 
main site, the agency reports that information provided by the public has led to state and federal 
enforcement cases and “ultimately served environmental protection well.”
171 As another sign of its 
desire to engage the public, in 2008 EPA set up a most-wanted list for defendants charged with 
environmental crimes or violations of the U.S. Federal Criminal Code. It encourages the public to 
report information to the local police or the nearest U.S. Embassy for those outside the United 
States.
172 
Of the 53 reviews of EPA activities conducted by OMB in 2003–2006, 3 focused on 
enforcement programs. OMB rated the civil enforcement and criminal enforcement programs as 
effective but found the agency’s pesticide enforcement grant program ineffective.
173 
Most academic research on EPA’s enforcement activities supports the view that the agency 
has strong and effective enforcement programs. A 1997 paper by Nadeau finds that EPA is effective 
at reducing the time plants are in violation of standards.
174 They estimate that a 10 percent increase in 
enforcement activity results in a 4–4.7 percent reduction in violation time.
175 Based on a sample of 
1990–1997 air, water and waste penalties, in a 2002 study, Firestone finds that EPA’s decision of 
which individuals to pursue penalty actions against—whether for administrative, civil judicial, or 
criminal actions—is consistent with the goal of minimizing environmental harm.
176 Using data on 
EPA’s enforcement and compliance by steel plants during the 1980s, Deily and Gray find evidence 
that the agency was influenced by the productivity of its abatement activities and not by the costs that 
would be imposed on the plant or by the expectation of resistance from politically powerful firms or 
those in financial distress.
177 
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A somewhat more critical view is provided by Rosenberg, who examined trends in EPA’s 
enforcement practices over 1999–2004.
178 His central conclusion is that administrative enforcement, 
with an emphasis on settlement, increasingly dominates the agency’s enforcement practices, dwarfing 
judicially supervised enforcement. Further, he finds that the civil penalties imposed are relatively 
small and, interestingly, tend to be adjusted downward in the course of the negotiation process. 
Although this may be efficient for the agency, he argues that this practice “may provide the regulated 
community with the idea that environmental enforcement does not present a serious threat to court 
enforcement, and so may not deter noncompliant conduct.”
179  
Main Points about EPA 
EPA is responsible for the administration of numerous statutes related to pollution and 
environmental quality, which leads to substantial variation in its approach to regulation. Some 
statutes grant EPA leeway in setting regulations, while others give very specific criteria for regulatory 
decisions. Some statutes allow economic and cost-benefit analysis, while others allow little or no use 
of such analysis. When possible, EPA makes extensive use of quantitative cost-benefit analysis, and 
its regulations were recognized by OMB for resulting in high levels of benefits relative to costs 
incurred.  
EPA generally does not employ voluntary consensus standards because it considers such 
standards inadequate. It does make extensive use of scientific peer review in developing and 
evaluating its regulations. 
EPA has a much more adversarial relationship with the industries it regulates than does MMS 
or FAA. Its regulations are routinely challenged in court, and litigation has led EPA to rely heavily on 
quantitative methods and scientific peer review.  
5. Recommendations for Enhancing Safety in Offshore Energy Activities 
In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster, improving safety and reducing risks 
associated with offshore oil and gas exploration and production require understanding (1) the 
historical and current performance context; (2) the particular sequence of events that contributed to 
the recent disaster; (3) private sector safety cultures, practices, and incentives; (4) risk assessment and 
risk management goals and practices; (5) regulatory and oversight methods, roles, responsibilities, 
and management practices; and (6) emergency preparedness and response capacities and practices.  
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In this paper, we have reviewed regulatory and oversight issues first by examining how MMS, 
the regulatory agency with offshore oil and gas oversight responsibilities, has fulfilled its regulatory 
role, and then by looking at the practices of two other agencies, FAA and EPA. The agency parallels 
are not perfect, since MMS (before its reorganization) was both a regulatory agency and manager of 
access to ocean resources through its leasing and planning processes. One would, as a consequence of 
mission differences among these agencies, expect some differences in approaches to their regulatory 
responsibilities.  
Nonetheless, a comparative evaluation of regulatory structures and management can help 
illuminate effective practices and opportunities for improvement. We emphasize that to be effective, 
the following recommendations must be accompanied by other changes in corporate culture, 
techniques, and operational incentives; emergency preparedness and response; and risk assessment. 
The Department of the Interior and its new Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 
Regulation, and Enforcement have undertaken several actions to improve the safety and reduce risks 
associated with offshore oil and gas activities. We consider two particularly important. The first is the 
reorganization, which when fully implemented will segregate safety and leasing functions into two 
separate bureaus. The second is the October 15, 2010, Final Rule on Safety and Environmental 
Management Systems, which incorporates by reference the entire API Recommended Practice 75, 
with its general procedures and all 12 specific elements. We consider this a clear improvement over 
the proposed rule, which would have required only 4 of the 12 elements. The final rule also 
emphasizes the external auditing role of the federal agency by requiring that firms undertake 
mandatory and periodic audits by independent third parties or by qualified internal personnel. In 
addition to these self-auditing requirements, the rule establishes conditions for the regulating agency 
to order independent third-party audits or directly undertake audits itself. Through the required 
auditing processes, the rule also emphasizes corrective action. In sum, this new rule is an important 
step forward. Below, we offer some additional recommendations. 
Agency Structure and Organization Oversight 
On May 19, 2010, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar issued an executive order announcing 
a reorganization of the Minerals Management Service. The reorganization places the leasing and 
safety functions of the agency in distinct organizations with separate supervisors to ensure 
independent attention to safety considerations in budgeting and decisionmaking. Through many 
years, various management reviews have suggested the benefits of a functional rather than primarily 
geographic organization structure for MMS. Separating the leasing and safety functions into two 
organizations takes this concept one step further. Interior has not yet completed the reorganization, 
pending an outside management review. We endorse the general outlines of the reorganization and 
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  Maintaining interbureau coordination on matters such as planning and leasing, expected levels 
of leasing and platform activity, and scientific research. 
  Providing safety capacity down to the field level rather than providing that capacity only at 
the regional level and in headquarters. 
Risk Assessment and Risk Management 
The safety agency should develop specific guidance on risk assessment and risk management 
methods and practices. We suggest two methodologies: 
  Setting quantitative thresholds or standards for acceptable, tolerable, and unacceptable risk. In 
reviews of particular rules, techniques, and practices, deviations from these standards should 
be based on rigorous analysis. Actual decisions about any deviations from the standards 
should be made at the highest levels of the agency. The practices of FAA, the United 
Kingdom’s Health and Safety Executive, and other agencies that use quantitative thresholds 
should be evaluated as possible models. 
  Using accident precursor analysis instead of historical spill data to develop risk assessments of 
low-probability major oil spills by identifying the failure probabilities of accident 
components.  
Regulatory Processes and Best Practices 
The agency should emphasize safety and environmental performance-based approaches to risk 
management, such as those used in Norway and the United Kingdom for offshore oil and gas 
development. Norway requires that each firm identify site-specific risks and hazards, articulate 
specific safety (risk reduction) performance goals, and show how those goals will be achieved 
through the techniques, practices, and mitigation measures they deploy at the site. The United 
Kingdom  requires firms to produce a safety case that evaluates hazards on a systematic and holistic 
basis and shows how the required levels of risk reduction will be achieved. We suggest four specifics: 
  In requiring this kind of operator accountability at each site, guidance should be developed to 
better assure that such operator self-analysis and risk-based performance assessments include 
key types of information in ways that are verifiable and capable of validation. Some form of 
independent, third-party audit of performance-based operator assessments should be used to 
help assure that these assessments or safety cases are relevant, complete, and utilized in 
operator implementation practices and decisions. BOEMRE (or new safety bureau) should 
also periodically audit operator self-assessments, adherence to assessment requirements, and 
overall performance at each site. 
  Consistent with our recommendation on establishing clear risk thresholds, the safety agency 
should apply these thresholds in evaluating alternative compliance options. The safety agency Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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should develop specific guidance to regions and field offices on how to implement alternative 
compliance mechanisms (where relevant), including evidence to establish whether alternatives 
are likely to meet established performance goals. 
 
  In identifying best practices, the agency should establish an independent peer review group 
(or groups) outside the ANSI (API Voluntary Standards) committees, including strong 
representation from outside the regulated community, to evaluate the adequacy of regulations 
for achieving the stated environmental health and safety standards and/or tolerable risk 
thresholds. In the past, MMS has contracted for independent risk assessments of particular 
equipment or structures and has periodically contracted for independent reviews of API 
voluntary consensus standards and their adequacy as the basis for MMS regulations. We 
propose that such independent review become formal and regular requirements of the 
agency’s regulatory oversight function. 
  The agency should consider establishing a permanent independent entity to investigate 
offshore oil spill accidents that meet certain criteria in order to determine the probable cause 
of the accident and to offer recommendations on how to prevent reoccurrences. One approach 
that should be considered is an independent body like the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB). A more recently created entity, the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 
Board, offers another model. Both are independent agencies, though they operate in close 
cooperation with the federal agencies with relevant regulatory responsibilities. As an 
alternative, FAA has also established the Civilian Aviation Safety Team (CAST) as a 
cooperative government-industry organization, co-chaired by FAA, to review safety incidents 
and recommend safety enhancements. 
The People Factor 
The agency’s move toward performance-based training requirements would benefit from two 
actions: 
  Encouraging a higher degree of cross-training among skill sets, to ensure the safe operations 
of a platform and associated exploration and production equipment and processes. 
  Using data concerning incidents of noncompliance to identify areas in which inspectors need 
additional or different training. Here, the agency could draw from the experiences of EPA’s 
compliance training program.  
Enforcement and Compliance 
We suggest two approaches: Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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  Continuing and strengthening the annual operator reviews, in which corrective actions are 
discussed. This process reinforces a focus on improvement, targeting poor performers and 
repeated incidents of noncompliance. 
  Creating a stronger incentive system for operators and contractors to report risks and problems 
without penalty (similar to programs developed by both FAA and EPA). The program would 
not apply to actions associated with criminal violations, fatal accidents, and major injuries.  
 
Appendix A. Laws That Influence Environmental Protection  
The following laws and executive orders help protect human health and the environment. EPA 
is charged with administering all or a part of each.  
  Atomic Energy Act (AEA) 
  Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act 
  Clean Air Act (CAA) 
  Clean Water Act (CWA) (original title: Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 
1972) 
  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, or 
Superfund) 
  Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)  
  Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
  Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) 
  Energy Policy Act 
  EO 12898: Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and 
Low-Income Populations 
  EO 13045: Protection of Children From Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks 
  EO 13211: Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use 
  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) 
  Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) Resources for the Future  Scarlett et al. 
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  Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments (see Clean Water Act) 
  Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) (see FFDCA and FIFRA) 
  Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA, also known as the Ocean 
Dumping Act) 
  National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)  
  National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA)  
  Noise Control Act  
  Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) 
  Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA) 
  Ocean Dumping Act (see Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act) 
  Oil Pollution Act (OPA) 
  Pesticide Registration Improvement Act (PRIA) (see FIFRA) 
  Pollution Prevention Act (PPA) 
  Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)  
  Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 
  Shore Protection Act (SPA)  
  Superfund (see Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act) 
  Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) (see Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act) 
  Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 